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The endurance of Arab authoritarian regimes has been quite daunting, especially 
with the rise of the Arab Spring. Some Arab regimes have ruled with domination and 
repression since the nineteenth century. These regimes stand out globally with respect to 
the number of democratic countries. Even with the recent rebellions, the rise of the Arab 
Spring, starting in 2011, a number of Arab regimes still continue to thrive and remain in 
tact under authoritarian rule. This includes quite a number of Arab states that have faced 
uprisings during the Arab Spring, but have not implemented a new democratic system or 
elected a new leader, such as Syria. With this fascinating reality of Arab authoritarian 
regimes, I set out to find the reason for the endurance of Arab authoritarian regimes, 
noting that this was not a simple coincidence. My goal was to find out what exactly 
allowed Arab authoritarian regimes to remain stable, whether it was political strategies or 
economic resources, even in the face of the Arab Spring. Overall, I was determined to 
obtain a grip on one solid and plausible reason as to why Arab authoritarian leaders have 
endured for so long, or at least a brief number of reasons. Arab authoritarianism has 
allowed the regimes to endure since the nineteenth century and continue to do so with 
protests and grievances amongst citizens.  
I decided to choose the topic of Arab authoritarian endurance because I 
understood the importance in exposing the backbone of the regimes. I truly believe that 
learning about the reasons for Arab authoritarian endurance empowers people of all 
backgrounds with the knowledge of strategies that dictates the lives of people in Arab 
states. Not only does this topic allow people to understand the power of Arab regimes in 
being able to rule with a strong fist, but also enables people to comprehend how most 
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Arab authoritarian regimes are able to continue to real with a stable regime even with the 
recent Arab uprisings. The endurance of Arab authoritarianism is most important in being 
able to analyze and compare Arab regimes that have fallen to the Arab Spring and the 
ones that continue to maintain durability.  
In order to complete this research task, I embarked on extensive research and used 
various methodologies. My thesis is split into four sections, with two main chapters. My 
first section is the literature review. I completed this portion by researching a broad range 
of arguments by a number of different scholars, such as the politicized education system, 
the condition of the coercive forces, hydrocarbon exports, and so on for the endurance of 
Arab authoritarian regimes. These arguments included reasons prior to the Arab Spring. 
The arguments used in my literature review all fall under political, economic, cultural, 
security, or educational reasons. 
My two main chapters consist of Jordan and Algeria. I chose these two regimes as 
my core chapters to create a balanced argument, as Jordan is a constitutional monarchy 
and Algeria is a semi-presidential republic. My methodologies for these chapters included 
conducting extensive research on each country with concern to the recent protests, 
government responses, and theories amongst scholars as to why these regimes continue to 
endure even after the Arab Spring. I also learned about the structure of each regime, such 
as its components, government supporters, government opponents, and security forces. I 
provided the structure of each regime in the beginning of each core chapter. Each of these 
countries have unique factors specific to their endurance, which helped me produce a 
compelling thesis. 
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The last section of my thesis includes a conclusion. My conclusion wraps up my 
entire thesis. I provided similarities and differences between Jordan and Algeria for the 
protests, government responses, and theories for the endurance of each country. In 
regards to the protests, I explained similarities and differences between Jordan and 
Algeria for the grievances, general ideals, organization, location, injuries, and the amount 
of security. As for the government responses, I provided similarities and differences for 
the economic and political responses. In regards to the theories, I included overlapping 
political theories for the endurance of each regime. I also focused on overlapping 
political, security, and economic reasons between the theories in the literature review and 
the theories for my core cases. I also provided results specific to each country for all of 
these areas. Finally, I discussed how adequate the literature review theories matched up 
to Jordan and Algeria, as well as arguments that should be added to the literature review 
theories. Lastly, I touched upon approaches from the literature review that were not 
widely argued by theorists for Jordan and Algeria.  
My findings did not end up including one solid and plausible reason as to why 
Arab authoritarian leaders have endured for so long, but rather a number of reasons for 
the lasting regimes. I argued that the main reasons for the endurance of Arab 
authoritarian regimes fall under political means, which were overlapping arguments for 
the core cases of Jordan and Algeria. These arguments include the creation of reforms 
and promises, the threat of chaos, and societal cleavages. My findings also included 
theories that fit with the literature. These arguments fall under political, security, and 
economic reasons. These arguments include legitimacy, multi-party system, 
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patrimonialism, resource wealth, international support, internal disagreements, and 
coercive security forces.  
The arguments reveal that each Arab authoritarian regime is able to endure due to 
distinct reasons, as each regime is different. However the theories of legitimacy, multi-
party system, patrimonialism, resource wealth, international support, internal 
disagreements, and coercive security forces stand out as the main arguments, as the 
reasons are common amongst almost all Arab authoritarian regimes. Overall, I argue that 
there is not one specific reason for the endurance of Arab authoritarian regimes, but 
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Literature Review 
 
Various theorists have argued about the reasons for this endurance of Arab 
authoritarian regimes. Some scholars have overlapping arguments, while many reasons 
clash. Overall most fall under political, economic, cultural, security, or educational 
reasons.   
 Among various arguments, political issues seem to be the most popular reasons 
among theorists for the endurance of Arab regimes. For instance, a number of scholars 
specifically point to the use of the multi-party system. Posusney claims that the 
oppositional groups have nowhere to move under this system because they are restricted 
under almost every area (Authoritarianism, 95). This includes the media, campaign 
activities, simple formation and registration as a political party. Incomplete 
parliamentarization, liberalized autocracies, the abundance of independent candidates, 
and financial fragility further restrict opposition groups. With respect to the media, the 
regime has complete control. The media is extremely restricted, especially for opposition 
parties. For example, radio stations need their programs approved by the secret police and 
one newspaper editor claimed “we can barely bring ourselves to express our opinions to 
our wives in our bedrooms and even then we are afraid” when responding to a question 
with regards to obeying the secret police about his cartoon section (The Media Relations 
195). One Jordanian columnist even claimed, “I feel like I am two people…on the one 
hand I am addressing the readers, but part of me is addressing all the security services 
watching me” (The Media Relations 197). When it comes to the regime, the government 
controls the media, using it to its own advantage and “creat[ing] the impression of 
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popular mandate for the leader” (Authoritarianism 95). Essentially the media is caged 
and opposition parties are unable to use it to their benefit. 
 When it comes to campaign activities and voting, opposition parties face many 
restraints. During the election, voters are often coerced if they support the challenger 
(Authoritarianism 91). Macfarquhar uses Qudah, a Jordanian poet, as an example. Qudah 
was jailed by the secret police after simply reciting a poem regarding Jordan’s political 
system (The Media Relations 192). Even though opposition parties face major setbacks 
due to restricted media coverage and campaign activities, creating the actual party itself is 
the most challenging. Posusney explains how new political parties need to register with 
the government to receive their permission for creation. Either this takes too long for the 
group to stay active, or its application is denied (Authoritarianism 95). Opposition parties 
end up working alone, which is completely ineffective (The Media Relations 180). 
Posusney and Macfarquhar mainly argue the restrictions political parties face that inhibit 
them from effectively seeking change in the government.   
Most scholars do not disagree with Posusney and Macfarquhar, as most Arab 
regimes have instilled restrictions that do in fact limit opposition parties under a multi-
party system. Still, some believe that certain aspects of the multi-party system are more 
significant than others in terms of sustaining the weakness of the opposition parties. 
Among the various other restrictions that the opposition parties face, Vicki Langhor also 
lists election fraud, repressive ruling, deficient access to public meeting spaces, and the 
mass mobilization of government security at protests. Langhor believes that these 
handicaps certainly slow down any opposition parties, but she argues that incomplete 
parliamentarization, a lack of voters due to the prevalence of independent candidates, and 
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financial constraints are the most important, as they limit opposition parties in 
particularly powerful ways. Insufficient parliamentarization refers to “significant 
deviations from general parliamentary procedure[s] such as allowing unelected upper 
houses to censure governments obstruct elected representatives” (Langhor 202). With 
incomplete parliamentarization, the government is able to diminish the influence of 
opposition parties, even when they win a large quantity of seats (Langhor 202). 
Relatedly, Brumberg illustrates a more broad aspect of some Arab regimes that 
allow them to continue to thrive: liberalized autocracy. Under this system, “a set of 
interdependent institutional, economic, ideological, social and geostrategic factors has 
created an adaptable ecology of repression, control, and partial openness” (“The Trap of 
Liberalized 57”). The idea is to create a regime with political openness, or perceived 
political openness. Through this system the state is constantly loosening and then 
tightening the restrictions on the rival parties, which completely throws them off balance 
and unable to improve as parties. Also, the periods of openness allow the parties to blow 
off steam so they do not build up anger towards an uprising (“Democratization Versus 
Liberalization”). 
The entire political ecosystem of a liberalized autocracy contributes to the 
survival of these partial autocracies and the power of the ruler, and as a result, the Arab 
leader refuses to relinquish any of their control over the regime. In some Arab countries, 
such as Algeria, Morocco, and Kuwait, the leaders will expand this idea and give some 
opposition groups representation in parliament. Some regimes even incorporate the 
process of “Islamization,” where Islamists will gain small-scale ideological and 
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bureaucratic control, but in reality they do not have much influence over the regime 
(“The Trap of Liberalized 57”). 
Furthermore, Langhor explains the importance of the abundance of independent 
candidates surrounded by other competing candidates. This inhibits the opposition parties 
because they take away a large number of seats that would have gone to the opposition 
parties (Langhor 205). Also, the abundance of independent candidates hurts the 
opposition parties because they weaken the progress of party programs. These party 
programs could be established as party alternatives to the authoritarian regime and take 
away its support (Langhor 203). Langhor argues “the prevalence of independent 
candidacy among non-ruling party candidates weakens the chances for effective 
opposition to authoritarian regimes by preventing the formation of well-defined 
alternatives that can win popular support” (Langhor 205).  
Lastly, Langhor emphasizes the financial fragility of opposition parties. This is 
mainly due to the fact that opposition parties do not have the business elites on their side 
because their interests or platforms do not overlap with the upper class. Rather, business 
elites look more towards sectoral groups because business opportunities are more 
controlled by authoritarian regimes. On top of this issue, the opposition parties have to 
rely on the government for finances and as a result, they aren’t provided with many funds 
to act as a functional party and win support (Langhor 205). 
 Among these various restrictions under the multi-party system, Lust-Okar argues 
that the government’s censorship of the more radical parties inhibits the more moderate 
oppositional parties from succeeding. In this case, Lust-Okar points out that the 
government may decide to restrict certain parties in elections, while others are granted the 
                                                                                                                                       Berger 10 
privilege to compete in elections, which creates moderation among the included groups 
(“Enduring Arab” 131). The moderates “fear that an alliance with excluded groups could 
force the regime to punish the moderates by further constricting their avenues for 
participation” (“Enduring Arab” 132). Essentially the moderating opposition parties lose 
numbers as a result of fear that they will be completely shut down by the government if 
they align with the excluded groups (“Enduring Arab” 132).  
 Although the multi-party system is significant, the perceived legitimacy of the 
Arab regimes is another politics-oriented approach to understanding the conditions that 
allow the Arab regimes to endure. Dawisha writes, “Arab leaders constantly endeavor to 
win their populations’ acceptance of or at least acquiescence to their leadership, usually 
by portraying themselves as meritorious and successful” (Dawisha 525). By creating an 
image as a popular and successful leader, the population believes that the regime is 
legitimate and working for the people. Dawisha also emphasizes how Arab regimes have 
formed hierarchical social systems, which appear to be legitimate with the authoritative 
figure at the top. As a result, Arab regimes lack insurgent tendencies among their citizens 
(Dawisha 525). 
 This hierarchical structure is further evident in Arab regimes that have had one 
tribe or one clique control the government over a long period of time. Macfarquhar 
reveals this structure in Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia, the Saud family and Wahabi 
clerics formed an alliance early in the 18
th
 century and still reign today. This gives them 
complete control over Saudi society and the people. Macfarquhar writes, “the clerical 
hierarchy views even the idea of laws emanating from public debate with suspicion, as if 
that process might erode G-d’s mandate” (255). The majority of princes are the only ones 
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that can bring about change in Saudi Arabia and it’s understood that it won’t occur 
anytime soon (The Media Relations 254).  
On top of the hierarchal structure with the perceived strong leader, Dawisha 
believes that the religion of Islam and the relationship between past and present 
conditions legitimize the regime to the citizens. With respect to the Islamic religion, 
renowned Muslim jurists ingrained significant imperatives that became a part of the 
religion’s heritage. Muslims feel the need to follow these significant imperatives today. 
They “prescribed total obedience to the ruler by fostering the belief that rebellion was the 
most heinous of crimes — a doctrine consecrated in the juristic maxim” (Dawisha 525). 
In regards to past and present experiences, memories of the past may change their view 
on the present, but the present conditions override these thoughts, such as modernization. 
Modernization and other transforming environments have strengthened the Arab people, 
as changing social conditions have delegitimized authoritarianism and traditional values 
with advanced education and Westernization. Even so, these present conditions have 
boosted Arab leaders even more so than the ruled because advanced technology has 
provided regimes with “access to methods of suppression that made earlier methods pale 
by comparison” (Dawisha 526). Also, through propaganda acts of creating new 
economic, social, and foreign policies that appear to be achievements and developments, 
Arab authoritarian leaders have been able to win the support of their citizens (Dawisha 
526). Ultimately, Dawisha argues that citizens under Arab regimes perceive the regime to 
be legitimate due to factors relating to hierarchal political structures, the imperatives of 
Islam, and the power of present conditions.  
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Whitaker presents two different political reasons for the lasting Arab regimes: 
patrimonialism and Western support. The argument about patrimonialism differs from 
Dawisha’s argument about perceived legitimacy. Whitaker claims that those at the top of 
the hierarchal structure do not turn against the regime because they are basically “bought 
off.” In this case, the leader will buy off those in the family, tribe, and other dependent 
groups with jobs, key appointments, and business privileges (Whitaker 97). These favors 
and resources will be denied to opponents of the regime, but the system guarantees the 
political support of the influential citizens in society (Whitaker 93). Whitaker explains, 
“holding the reins of power allows Arab regimes to grant business privileges to 
themselves or to others in exchange for support, or to restrict the business activities of 
those who are out of favour” (Whitaker 97). Since the opponents are denied resources, 
they are unable to develop as a rising power, while those at the top help the regime grow 
because they are pleased with their patronage (Whitaker 97). 
Whitaker also argues that Western support has created lasting Arab regimes. 
Many Arab regimes have been able to keep a fairly solid relationship with the West, 
which Whitaker finds to be significant because it helps them stay on the path towards 
modernity and most importantly, it keeps the West from coming down hard on the 
regimes (Whitaker 106). The Arab regimes have been able to keep these relationships at a 
balance, where they still receive support from the West, but they don’t run into 
unfavorable domestic repercussions that can harm the legitimacy of the regime. Western 
support has come in the form of economic aid and military assistance, which has helped 
Arab regimes endure with financial help to strengthen the regime and extra security 
forces to fight off any opponents. To keep the West happy and the citizens from forming 
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grievances, the regimes will act as if they are emerging democracies without fully 
reforming. For example, Whitaker explains how Saudi Arabia implemented local 
government elections in 2005, but women weren’t even able to vote and the royal family 
allocated fifty percent of the seats (Whitaker 107). The Arab regimes essentially set up a 
system where they are able to keep everyone content, including the West, without fully 
reforming and revealing their true reliance on the West. 
Lastly amongst political reasons, Langhor and Whitaker point to other civil 
society groups, aside from political parties. Langhor believes that there is too much civil 
society and not enough politics to build a democracy. Langhor reveals how Arab citizens 
take a bigger role in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society 
groups rather than in political parties. The Arab citizenry would rather partake in NGOs 
because they appeal to specific interests and allow citizens to raise funds much more 
easily, but they are not promising for democratization for the long run (Langhor 193). 
The main issue with NGOs is their advocacy focus, which is usually for a specific issue 
or goal. For example, Langhor explains that an NGO can be focused only on human 
rights issues, which is not productive enough to mobilize a wider range of constituencies 
around the more significant issue of democratization (Langhor 195). 
In opposition to Langhor, Whitaker believes that civil society is too weak, which 
fuels the endurance of Arab regimes. Just like political parties, civil society groups, such 
as NGOs, and press publications need to apply for a license. Whitaker explains how Arab 
citizens don’t even apply for licenses because they have witnessed the government 
decline licenses far too many times. For example, Hisham Kassem, an Egyptian citizen, 
attempted to create a weekly news magazine, but “recognizing that in the previous ten 
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years only four political weeklies and one monthly had been granted licenses, and that the 
founders of all four weeklies had strong connections with the government, Kassem 
decided not to bother applying for a license” (Whitaker 180). Even worse, the Saudis 
need the approval of the king just to form a civil society organization based on human 
rights or corruption (Whitaker 181). The restrictions will vary across each Arab regime, 
but overall Whitaker argues that civil society is extremely weak under Arab regimes 
because civic and social organizations do not have the power nor resources to come 
together as a group and discuss grievances.  
 In addition to political reasons, a large number of economic reasons for lasting 
authoritarianism under the Arab regimes have advanced. Under this approach, several 
theorists, including Whitaker and Macfarquhar, believe that many Arab regimes are able 
to thrive due to their extensive income from hydrocarbon exports, foreign aid, and rents. 
Whitaker and Macfarquhar believe these sources of income place the regimes in a good 
enough economic stance, where they do not need to implement an income tax, keeping 
the citizens at ease and happy with the government, especially when taxes are compared 
to ones in the United States. Whitaker explains, “english history might have taken a 
different course if Charles, like many Arab rulers today, had been able to draw on other 
financial resources, such as oil. He might well have stayed in power, regardless of his 
unpopularity, and continued to rule without recourse to parliament” (Whitaker 102). 
Essentially many Arab regimes are able to rely on resources such as oil to build the state 
and they do not have to worry about pressure by their citizens for accountability because 
the levels of taxation are extremely low, especially direct income taxes. Whitaker argues 
that citizens would move towards a demand for democracy if taxes were high because 
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they would call for a voice in how the taxes are distributed (Whitaker 102). Brumberg 
somewhat disagrees with this argument, mainly in regards to oil money, because there are 
many Arab regimes that rely on oil as their source of income, but are not total autocracies 
(“The Trap of Liberalized” 57). 
 Macfarquhar agrees with Whitaker, but focuses on Saudi Arabia. Macfarquhar 
writes, “indulgence toward reformists tends to rise and fall in tandem with the price of 
oil—in lean times, the royals are more prone to react to grievances than when they are 
flush with cash and feel they can buy everyone off” (255). Not only does Macfarquhar 
argue that Saudi Arabia, like many other Arab states, has low taxation policies, but also 
the al-Sauds use their oil income in a patrimonial way. Reformists in Saudi Arabia are 
paid off and therefore choose not to act as dissidents. Out of all the known reserves, 
Saudi Arabia has total authority over one quarter of them, which allows the al-Sauds to 
exercise “complete control over the world’s richest oil resources” (The Media Relations 
254). The number of dissidents in Saudi Arabia has declined immensely as many of them 
have become millionaires, allowing Saudi Arabia to prosper as an authoritarian regime 
(The Media Relations 255). 
  Whitaker and Macfarquhar may argue that the regime is rich from hydrocarbon 
exports, foreign aid, and rent, but some scholars emphasize that in many Arab regimes, 
the people themselves are poor. This economic condition leads to poor education, low 
literacy rates, and inequality. Bellin writes, “it is not unusual for a fifth of the population 
in a given country to fall below the poverty line, 32 percent of adults are illiterate, and 
MENA states rank in the bottom half of the UN’s human development index despite the 
enormous wealth of several MENA countries” (Authoritarianism 23). As a result of these 
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conditions, the elite and masses tend to forget about democratic reform and focus their 
attention on these issues. The masses don’t view democratic reform as essential with 
these conditions on their hands and the elite are not fearful of the economic issues. 
Therefore, there are not many groups between the masses and the elite that strive for 
democratic reform (Authoritarianism 23).  
 Along with political and economic reasons, cultural reasons play a huge role 
among many theorists. The most popular argument among cultural reasons concerns the 
Arab culture and Islamic religion. The Islamic religion was previously discussed under 
political reasons, but only with regard to the fact that aspects of the religion created a 
perceived legitimacy for the political leader. Luciani claims that Islam, as the main 
religion among Arabs, tends to shape their cultural attitudes. The Islamic religion is such 
a dominant part of many Arabs’ lives that it is “much more than a system of spiritual 
guidance; it is accepted as a comprehensive social, political, legal and cultural system, 
and as such, even after years of ‘modernisation’ and ‘secularisation’, Islam remains a 
powerful and pervasive force in the Arab world” (Luciani 287). Luciani highlights the 
supremacy of the Islamic religion among Arabs and its power to form cultural views.  
 Luciani expands the notion of how Islam shapes cultural attitudes and explains 
how renowned Muslim jurists and various theologians carried on the importance of the 
Islamic religion after the prophet passed away and turned it into a central authority. 
Through the worldview of these jurists and theologians, Arabs today believe that, 
“‘rebelling is the most heinous of crimes’ and ‘sixty years of tyranny are better than one 
hour of civil strife’” (Luciani 288). They even implemented claims of the Caliph 
regarding obedience to the leader. Ultimately, these claims became embodied within the 
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Arab culture and Luciani argues that Arabs’ adherence to the Islamic religion shapes the 
way in which they react towards authority, or rather the inaction they take against the 
government. Luciani believes that the Islamic religion, or at least the version that 
renowned jurists and theologians have passed down, explains the endurance of Arab 
authoritarianism for the most part (288).   
 Whitaker also points to Islam as the main reason for Arab authoritarian 
endurance. Whitaker doesn’t exactly touch upon the ways in which Islam has been passed 
down to discourage the formation of opposition groups and uprisings, rather, he explains 
the importance of Islam’s message that fosters complete obedience to the Arab leader. 
Since Islam is embedded in the Arab culture, Arab citizens strictly follow the Islamic 
religion. Rather than a separation between church and state, Arab regimes fuse religion 
and the state, where Arab leaders rule with the power of g-d and build on the negative 
connotations associated with secularism (Whitaker 137). Therefore Arab citizens are 
completely compliant to the Arab leader because at the end of the day, the law comes 
from “g-d” (Whitaker 144). As a result, “g-d’s laws”, or the regime’s laws overrides 
popular sovereignty.  
 Along with Luciani and Whitaker, Brumberg mentions the significance of Islam, 
but in terms of the way in which Arab rulers use it to gain the title as “supporters of the 
Islamic community and Arab nation” (“The Trap of Liberalized” 58). Since Islam has 
taken an important role in the lives of many Arabs, they are able to relate to one another 
and come together as a community. Arab leaders manipulate this commonality and act in 
a way that makes them look like they are completely devoted to the Islamic community 
and citizens in general, and not just the regime itself. Brumberg refers to this condition as 
                                                                                                                                       Berger 18 
“the ‘harmonic’ foundation of legitimacy: Total autocracies spread the idea that the 
state’s mission is to defend the supposedly unified nature of the Arab nation or the 
Islamic community” (“The Trap of Liberalized” 58). 
 Another cultural argument explaining lasting Arab regimes is the significance of 
family honor. Whitaker labels this phenomenon as the “gilded cage” because Arabs will 
be able to use family connections to go very far in life. However there are many 
restrictions involved, especially for women, which keep them in the cage of family honor. 
This cultural aspect among Arab families has a great impact on the regimes because 
“regimes are products of the societies they govern” (Whitaker 48-49). Whitaker explains 
how these household relationships reflect the political regime, where citizens will act 
obediently to the regime because they were brought up to keep family honor and stay 
duteous to their clan or tribe. Whitaker writes, “the patriarchal attitudes observed at 
ground level in the family are replicated throughout society, right up to the top, rulers and 
political leaders are cast in the image of the father” (Whitaker 52). Macfarquhar agrees 
with Whitaker with regard to the reason of family honor, but he mainly uses the case 
study of Saudi Arabia to present this argument. Women are forced to stay in the private 
sphere for the most part, as they need permission from their husbands to go places, they 
are not allowed to drive, and they must be fully covered outside the home (The Media 
Relations 262). Ultimately, many Arab households demand obedience to the family 
honor, which keeps the citizens in line as submissive beings to the regime.  
 In addition to political, economic, and cultural arguments, many scholars believe 
that the amount of coercion and security used by Arab regimes is the main factor 
contributing to the endurance of authoritarianism in the Arab world. Brumberg and 
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Brownlee touch upon similar examples associated with coercion. Brumberg focuses on 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, explaining that the main concern of the regimes is to build 
up their security forces and “to absorb or repress rival political voices” (“The Trap of 
Liberalized” 58). Brumberg points out the risks of these actions, such as the loyalty of the 
security forces. For example, in Saudi Arabia, a close alliance has been formed between 
the House of Saud and Wahabi institutions, but the Wahabi religious establishments can 
revolt against the regime at any time and join Islamist opposition forces (“The Trap of 
Liberalized” 58). Even so, Brumberg still considers these coercive forces to be one of the 
main reasons for Arab authoritarian endurance. 
 Brownlee also argues that the condition of coercive forces as the main reason for 
Arab authoritarianism. However, unlike Brumberg, Brownlee believes that Arab security 
forces are completely loyal to the regime. He thinks that rather than looking at the culture 
of the Arab regions, theorists should analyze the regime’s coercive apparatus. Brownlee 
argues that in the event of an uprising, the security forces would be ready to “deploy 
violence against the opponents” at any time (Brownlee 44). Many Middle East states 
reveal this oppressive factor, which is linked to low instances of possible regime changes 
(Brownlee 44). For example, prior to the Arab Spring, Syria faced an uprising in 1982. 
“He [Assad] brutally suppressed his most active opponents, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
when they challenged his forces in the city of Hama. Heavy repression ended the 
opposition’s effort to change the regime. Since then Syria has seen twenty more years of 
continued authoritarianism” (Brownlee 49). Essentially, Arab security forces are more 
loyal to the regime than to their nation and citizens.  
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 Similar to Brownlee, Bellin believes that the endurance of Arab authoritarianism 
“lies not in cultural or socioeconomic factors but rather in the character of the Middle 
Eastern state and, most importantly, the exceptional strength and will of its coercive 
institutions to repress all democratic initiatives” (Authoritarianism 21). Bellin establishes 
her argument as a little different from Brownlee’s theory by explaining the Arab regime’s 
coercive apparatus and capacity to repress in more depth and adding further factors that 
justify the authoritarian capacity (Authoritarianism 21).  
 Bellin disagrees with arguments related to the insufficiency of prerequisites to 
democratize: weak civil society, the state’s control of the economy, poverty, low literacy 
levels, geographical location, and Arab culture. Although Bellin agrees that the many 
Arab countries lack these various prerequisites, “the MENA [Middle East and North 
Africa] region is in no way unique for its poor endowment with the prerequisites of 
democracy. Other regions similarly deprived have nonetheless managed to make the 
transition” (Authoritarianism 23). For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, civil society is 
extremely weak, but a number of the countries have been able to make some democratic 
transitions (Authoritarianism 23). Therefore, Bellin argues that the prerequisites of 
democracy argument is not sufficient to explain the lack of democratization in the Arab 
world, even if a country has combination of all of the factors (Authoritarianism 24). 
 Rather than looking at prerequisites of democracy, Bellin believes theorists should 
look deeper than the inability to achieve the prerequisites because they are not applicable 
to just the MENA region. Bellin refers to Theda Skocpol in explaining her argument 
behind the real reason for Arab endurance. Bellin writes, “the answer, Skocpol argued, 
lies in the strength of the state and, most important, the state’s capacity to maintain a 
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monopoly on the means of coercion. If the state’s coercive apparatus remains coherent 
and effective, it can face down popular disaffection and survive significant legitimacy” 
(Authoritarianism 25). Even though Skocpol explains this idea in regards to revolution, 
Bellin argues that it can apply to a democratic transition (Authoritarianism 25). 
 With Bellin’s reference to Skocpol, she explains that her argument remains within 
the threatening capacity and will of Arab states rather than the prerequisites of 
democracy. The problem belongs to present conditions that sustain robust 
authoritarianism (Authoritarianism 26). “The answer, it argues, lies not in cultural and 
social economic factors but rather in the character of the Middle Eastern state and, most 
important, the exceptional strength and will of its coercive institutions to repress all 
democratic initiatives” (Authoritarianism 21). Arab states are extremely robust due to the 
performance of its armed forces, which comes as a result of the funds and mobilization 
put into the security forces. “Most [Middle East and North Africa states], moreover, 
enjoy sufficient revenue to sustain exceedingly robust expenditure on their security 
apparatuses. In fact these expenditures are among the highest in the world. MENA states 
are the world leaders in terms of proportion of GNP spent on security” (Authoritarianism 
31). Middle East countries, along with North African countries, spend the most on arms 
and have an extremely high number of citizens engaged in the security forces. Arab 
authoritarian regimes invest exceptional effort into their security apparatuses, 
strengthening their forces to fight against any opposition groups (Authoritarianism 31). 
Bellin further explains how the coercive capacity of Arab regimes is explained by 
four factors. These factors include the states’ rent abundance, support from foreign 
countries, the patrimonial nature of the regime, and low levels of popular mobilization for 
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change (Authoritarianism 21). “First the robustness of the coercive apparatus is directly 
linked to maintenance of fiscal health. The security establishment is most likely to ‘give 
up the ghost’ when its financial foundation is seriously compromised” (Authoritarianism 
27). Arab authoritarian regimes have even spent more of its GNP on defense than the 
global average in the past (Authoritarianism 31). Through rentier income from various 
endowments, such as, petroleum or gas resources, Arab authoritarian regimes are able to 
build up its security forces by spending more on defense rather than on education and 
welfare (Authoritarianism 32).  
 The second factor, international support, is crucial to the coercive apparatus. 
“Withdrawal of international backing triggers both an existential and financial crisis for 
the regime that often devastates both its will and capacity to carry on” (Authoritarianism 
27). Compared to many other regions, Arab states receive exceptional support from 
foreign countries. Even after the end of the Cold War, Arab authoritarian regimes were 
still receiving international patronage, as Western countries wanted to assure its oil 
sources and the containment of Islamic threat (Authoritarianism 32-33). Bellin argues 
patrimonialism and institutionalization as a third factor that shapes the coercive 
apparatus. Bellin argues that institutionalization refers to Arab authoritarian states with a 
coercive apparatus that “is rule governed, predictable and meritocratic” and “promotion is 
based on performance not politics” (Authoritarianism 28). Therefore, institutionalized 
security forces are more loyal to the country, rather than the regime. Bellin explains how 
most Arab authoritarian states encompass a patrimonial coercive apparatus. With 
patrimonialism, “staffing decisions are ruled by cronyism; the distinction between public 
and private mission is blurred, leading to widespread corruption and abuse of power” 
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(Authoritarianism 28). In a patrimonial society, the security forces are more loyal to the 
regime, rather than the country itself. Therefore, security forces in Arab authoritarian 
states with patrimonialism are more dedicated to the regime and willing to repress. Arab 
states with a patrimonial coercive apparatus are more likely to shoot citizens if they were 
to rebel against the regime (Authoritarianism 34).  
Lastly, in concern to the fourth factor, the level of popular mobilization for 
political reform, Bellin believes “the high costs of massive repression will not deter elites 
who believe the will be ruined by reform” (Authoritarianism 29). The level of popular 
mobilization remains low and therefore Arab countries do not have to put high costs into 
repression. “Low levels of popular mobilization for democratic reform are a reality in the 
MENA region. They lower the costs of repression for the coercive apparatus and increase 
the likelihood that the security establishment will resort to thwart reform initiatives” 
(Authoritarianism 35). The low levels of popular mobilization strengthen the coercive 
apparatus, as Arab authoritarian regimes are able to spend less of its funds on repression 
(Authoritarianism 35). These present conditions “shape the robustness of a regime’s 
coercive apparatus” (Authoritarianism 27). Ultimately, Bellin argues the endurance of 
Arab authoritarianism lies in the state’s powerful and effective coercive apparatus.  
 Lastly, Macfarquhar also emphasizes the significance of Arab coercion and 
security forces as a significant factor to authoritarianism in the Middle East. Here he 
mainly focuses on just the role of secret police in the Middle East (The Media Relations 
180). Macfarquhar writes, “secret police agencies, or ‘mukhabarat’ in Arabic, are a 
powerful and ubiquitous force in every Middle Eastern country. Any public declaration 
even hinting at criticism of the regime inevitably attracts their attention” (The Media 
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Relations 181). Arab citizens sometimes explain that the main goal of the secret police is 
to spy on the citizenry. They are mainly there to listen, arrest, interrogate, and restrict 
activity (The Media Relations 181). For example, the secret police in Jordan, the GID 
(General Intelligence Department), requires students to receive a good behavior 
document from them if they would like to apply for a certain government program at a 
public university (The Media Relations 182). Macfarquhar mainly explains the everyday 
actions and goals of the secret police and its ability to keep opposition forces in line 
through spying, interrogation, arrests, and restrictions.  
 Among political, economic, cultural, and security reasons, education plays a role 
as an argument. Whitaker believes education is significant because it is a politicized area 
under Arab regimes. Children grow up as passive learners because the students are taught 
to regurgitate the material and not to question the professor. Whitaker says the result is a 
form of detachment, where “there is no real thinking about anything” and therefore the 
students become gullible to manipulation (Whitaker 22). In turn, the students are actually 
truly manipulated by the government rather than the professor because the authorities 
monitor the textbooks and the education system (Whitaker 17). The teaching curriculum 
and teaching methods “‘do not permit free dialogue and active, exploratory learning and 
consequently do not open the doors to freedom of thought and criticism. On the contrary, 
they weaken the capacity to hold opposing viewpoints and to think outside the box. Their 
societal role focuses on the reproduction of control in Arab societies’” (Whitaker 19). 
The government’s main goal is to instill loyalty, compliance, and support for the regime 
in power through education so there are no dissidents, which Whitaker finds to be 
particularly successful.  
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 The endurance of Arab authoritarianism has been a concerning topic among 
scholars as many regimes still stand today. Various theorists have argued over the reasons 
for the lasting Arab regimes. Some theorists argue more than one reason, completely 
oppose others, or support a similar argument. Overall, the most popular reasons are 
among political, economic, cultural, security, and educational categories. 
The following chapters focus on Jordan and Algeria. These chapters follow fit 
with the substance of the literature review, as each regime is an Arab authoritarian state. 
Jordan is a monarchy, while Algeria is a republic. Each regime continues to endure today, 
and thus supports theories in the literature review. These chapters open up the debate 
about the reason as to why Arab authoritarian regimes endure after the Arab Spring. 
Through these core chapters, I hope to expand the knowledge of readers in terms of Arab 
authoritarianism and the way in which people view the regimes today. Through my 
extensive research and analysis, I hope to create increased knowledge in the area of Arab 
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Chapter 1: Jordan 
 
At the end of 2010, the Arab Spring began in the Middle East. Tunisia was the 
first country to be affected by the Arab Spring, but then it spread to other Middle Eastern 
countries. In early 2011, protests began in Jordan’s capital and then continued to spread 
around the country. Even with the large numbers of protests in Jordan, the monarchy still 
continues to last, as King Abdullah II has dealt with the uprisings through religious, 
economic, and political strategies.   
Jordan’s Regime 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy. King Abdullah 
II currently presides as the king of Jordan (Politics and Society 307). “In Jordanian 
politics, executive power is invested mainly in the hands of the king, but also in those of 
his appointed prime minster and cabinet (the Council of Ministers). The political system 
also includes a bicameral legislature, with a royally appointed fifty-five-member upper 
house and a popularly elected 110-member lower house” (Politics and Society 313). 
According to Jordan’s constitution, the king has the power to appoint the prime minister 
and the various members of the cabinet. In 1952, Jordan’s parliament was given more 
authority, but the king of Jordan still “retains ultimate authority over the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches” and “executive power is primarily invested in the king” 
(Politics and Society 307). The king also has the authority to dismiss the cabinet 
members, but the parliament has the power to dismiss the prime minister. Currently, the 
king has full power over the government and all of Jordan when parliament is dissolved. 
Ryan writes, “the king’s considerable powers include the right to sign and promulgate 
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laws, veto legislation, issue royal decrees (with the consent of the prime minister and our 
cabinet members), approve amendments to the constitution, command the armed forces, 
and declare war. In addition, he appoints and dismisses judges” (Politics and Society 
307). The eldest son of King Abdullah will be the next leader of Jordan, as the eldest son 
of the royal family assumes the throne (Politics and Society 307). Jordan’s law is based 
off of Islamic law, European values, and tradition (Politics and Society 308). Overall, 
Jordan’s main power comes from King Abdullah II, but parliament still has considerable 
authority, such as the ability to dismiss the prime minister, initiate debates, vote on 
legislation, and most recently, the power to elect the prime minister (“Jordan’s 
Parliament”).  
The backbone of Jordan’s regime is made up of the Hashemite family, the prime 
minister, Jordan’s armed forces, and strong supporters of the monarchy. “The 110 
members of the lower house are divided among 45 multimember constituencies, all of 
which have traditionally been strong supporters of the Hashemite monarchy. These 
include six seats for the rural Bedouin, nine seats for the Christian community, and three 
sets for the Circassian and Chechen communities” (Politics and Society 313). Lastly, 
Jordan is highly supported by western countries, including the United States that supplies 
foreign aid to Jordan’s regime (Shaikh) 
The main oppositional groups in Jordan are secular, leftists and Islamist activists. 
Communists, Baathists, and remaining pan-Arab nationalists are among the secular and 
left-leaning activists. The Islamist activists are much more influential and organized in 
Jordan compared to the secular leftists. “The Islamist movement in Jordan is mainly in 
Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist movement as old as the Hashemite regime 
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itself, and the movement’s political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAC)” (Politics and 
Society 315). Ultimately, Jordan’s regime faces opposition from two main categories 
(Politics and Society 315). Most importantly, “whether rooted in Islam, in pan-Arab 
nationalism, or in secular leftist ideas, the political opposition in Jordan has tended to 
struggle with the regime over policy and the direction of the state (including demands for 
greater democratization), but has not tended to challenge the nature of the state itself as a 
Hashemite monarchy” (Politics and Society 317). This concept has been fairly reflective 
in the most recent protests in Jordan, starting in the beginning of 2011, mainly organized 
by the Muslim Brotherhood (Politics and Society 317).  
Jordan’s security forces are made up of three branches. These branches consists of 
“the Jordan Arab Army, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Coast Guards” and “Jordan 
also has a highly efficient police force, border police and desert patrols who form the 
Public Security Force” (“The Armed Forces”). The army is completely volunteer-based, 
but eighty-five percent of the army budget is spent on salaries, training, and protection for 
the soldiers. “Jordan’s Public Security Force includes approximately 25,000 persons, who 
primarily perform police duties. Jordan also has a Civil Defense Brigade, which includes 
the Kingdom’s firefighters and ambulance personnel, and an Intelligence Service” (“The 
Armed Forced”).  
Furthermore, Jordan has an intelligence agency, the General Intelligence Agency 
(GID), which is known to be a very effective and a professional organization. The main 
purpose of the GID is to “safeguard the security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
domestically and abroad by means of carrying out necessary intelligence operations” 
(GID). Even so, the GID is referred to as Jordan’s secret police, also known as the 
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Mukhabarat in Arabic. The secret police use systems of surveillance to monitor 
opposition groups in Jordan (Aslam). Macfarquhar writes, “those seeking democratic 
reform say the central role of each country's secret police force, with its stealthy, octopus-
like reach, is one of the biggest impediments to democratic change. In the decades since 
World War II, as military leaders and monarchs smothered democratic life, the security 
agencies have become a law unto themselves” (“Smothering Democracy”).  
Protests in Jordan 
After the Arab Spring began in Tunisia and Egypt, Jordan experienced its first 
major protest on January 14, 2011 in front of the Al Omari mosque in Karak. The protest, 
organized by a small leftist group and Baathist parties, began over the issue of food 
prices, but the demonstrators were mainly enraged with overall economic conditions and 
Samir Rifai’s government. One of the protesters, Taqfiq al-Batoush, explains, “we are 
protesting the policies of the government – high prices and repeated taxation that made 
the Jordanian people revolt” (“Hundreds Protest”) A few days before the protest, the 
Jordanian government announced its commitment to cut food and fuel prices, but this was 
not sufficient for the citizens, as they did not consider the reforms to be significant 
enough and suspected they would most likely be temporary (“Hundreds Protests”) 
Only about 400 people made it to the protest in Karak, but another 200 people 
showed up to a protest in Dhiban. Another demonstrator, Khaled al-Majali, explained, 
“we are calling for the departure of Samir Rifai's government and a government of 
national unity, not a government of Amman corporations” (“Hundreds Protest”). 
Ultimately, Jordanians were inspired by the Arab Spring and used this time to rebel 
against high prices, taxes, lack of job creation in a public sector for tribesmen, and the 
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general economic conditions that they believed were leading to poverty (“Hundreds 
Protest”). 
  A little over a week later, Jordanian citizens gathered for another protest 
organized by the dominant Islamist opposition group in Jordan, the Islamic Action Front, 
which is also the Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm. The protests were similar to the 
first one, as the demonstrators called for the same reforms and the resignation of Jordan’s 
Prime Minister, Samir Rifai, except this time over 3,000 activists showed up in Amman. 
They also demanded an end to corruption, inflation, and increasing prices. An extra two 
2,500 people also protested in several other cities in Jordan (“Jordanian Protesters 
Demand”).  
Jordan’s king decided to appoint a new Prime Minister, Marouf al-Bakhit, for the 
second time. Kadri and Bronner write, “changing cabinets is not new for King Abdullah. 
In his 12 years on the throne, he has done so eight times. But this was the first time that 
he had done so in reaction to public pressure, seeking to undermine a growing protest 
movement across a broad spectrum of society to pre-empt further unrest” (“King of 
Jordan”). Jordanians were still unhappy and formed another protest on February 2nd, 
2011. This was a much smaller protest, compared to the protests prior to it, and only 
mainly involved the Islamic Action Front and leftist groups. This protest called for 
political reforms, an end to government corruption, and even the resignation of the new 
prime minister (Maktabi). The activists were unhappy with the lack of democracy in 
Jordan, as King Abudullah only responded by appointing a past prime minister to 
reshuffle the government. Therefore, the activists demanded reforms during their 
demonstrations, such as an elected prime minister (“Jordan Islamists”). 
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 The protests in Jordan continued on February 18, 2011. The protests were held in 
Amman at the Al-Husseini mosque, where for the first time activists were injured during 
a peaceful demonstration. There were only about 300 protesters demanding political 
reform, but about eight of them were injured after clashing with a pro-government group 
carrying sticks and metal batons. Muwafak Mahadeen, a newspaper columnist and 
demonstrator, claims, “‘we were not calling for the downfall of the regime but for an 
elected government, democratic laws, opening the corruption files and against the peace 
agreement with Israel’” (Greenberg). Mahadeen believes that the government supporters 
were most likely deployed by the government’s forces, as the police did not even attempt 
to mediate the situation (Greenberg).  
The following Friday, Jordan experienced its largest protests thus far. About 
8,000 protesters rallied in the streets of Amman for a pro democracy demonstration, 
calling it the “Day of Anger.” All of the protesters, alongside the Islamic Action Front, 
had different grievances, but ultimately “demonstrators want[ed] greater political say and 
economic change at home” after learning about the power of the Tunisian and Egyptian 
uprising (“Middle East Protests”). Most of the Jordanian activists showed up as a 
backlash to the violence that had occurred in the protest the previous Friday (“Thousands 
Rally”).  The protestors did not want a regime change, but rather reforms and more rights 
(“Middle East Protests”).  
 On March 24, 2011, a group labeled, the “March 24th” Movement,” set up a camp 
with tents in the heart of Amman. Over 1,000 protesters showed up for the tent camp, 
modeling themselves after Tahir Square protest in Cairo. The idea was similar to one of a 
“sit in,” as they claimed they would not move from their tents until real reforms were put 
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into place. A number of the protesters were young students who learned about the protest 
through Internet sources, such as Facebook. One of the protesters, Abdullah Habiba, a 
twenty-two-year old student, explained “‘this is my first demonstration, and I heard about 
it on Facebook” and “I study political science in the university. I want the parliament 
dissolved and new elections. Now this is the only way forward’” (“Jordan Protesters Set 
Up)”. The protesters were looking for tangible reforms, such as economic equality and an 
end to corruption (“Jordan Protesters Set Up”).  
  A day later the protesters clashed once again with government supporters in 
Amman. This time one demonstrator died and 130 were injured. Rather than acting as 
bystanders, the police stepped in this time with the use of water cannons to halt the 
fighting. Even so, there were reports commenting on misbehavior by the government 
security forces. One of the protesters claimed “‘the [pro-monarchy] thugs were throwing 
stones from one side and police were attacking protesters with sticks to push them 
back,’” and a Reuters cameraman explained how he was tackled by government 
supporters and Jordanian police (“Protests in Jordan Turn”). Many Jordanians are huge 
supporters of the government and refused to watch protesters attempt to make changes 
that could lead to a possible regime change (“Protests in Jordan Turn”). 
 A third clash between the protesters and government supporters broke out on 
April 1
st
, 2011. Over 1,000 officers were mobilized in Amman to make sure violence did 
not erupt during the time. The demonstrators were mainly looking for a constitutional 
change and the dissolution of parliament. In response, the government supporters, also 
known as government loyalists, were holding pictures of the King and shouting out 
slogans, such as “long live the king” (Jiang).  
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The clash continued on April 15
th
, 2011 when extreme Islamists had an altercation 
with government supporters in Zarqa. Halaby writes, “a crowd of about 350 extremist 
Salafi Muslims faced off with a slightly smaller group of pro-king loyalists in the town of 
Zarqa. Salafis beat the government supporters with clubs and fists, and the two sides 
hurled stones at each other, leaving people bloodied on the ground” (Wong). Rather than 
the usual leftists and moderate Islamist groups, the Salafi movement led the protest. The 
Salafi movement is ultra-conservative, and banned in Jordan. The altercation began after 
the Salafi group spoke in front of the Omar ibn Khattab mosque, attacking Jordan’s 
alliance with the United States. The Salafi group also called for Islamic Shariah law to 
rule Jordan, rather than the typical protesters calling for political and economic reforms. 
Dozens of people ended up injured in the clash, including a couple in critical condition 
(Wong).  
On the same day of the Salafi movement protest, over 1,000 protesters 
demonstrated in Amman. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front put the 
demonstration together. This group of protesters was demanding similar reforms from the 
past fourteen weeks and the dissolution of the cabinet. The protest escalated between the 
Islamists and government supporters, thus turning the protest into a violent event. 
“Jordanian police used tear gas at Islamist protesters Friday after six officers were 
stabbed and seriously injured” and “forty policemen were injured, including six stabbed, 
as they tried to disperse a demonstration by Islamist Salafists in Zarqa” (Albawaba) The 
heightened violence occurred after Salafists had attacked some innocent citizens 
(Albawaba).  
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The protests died down until June of 2011. On June 13, 2011, King Abdullah II 
visited a tribal town in Jordan, Tafileh. The youth protesters had demonstrated against 
government corruption prior to his visit. The youth activists were denied a request to 
meet the king, and subsequently responded with an outbreak of violence. As a result, 
about thirty police officers were injured and the rioters burned several cars (Kadri). In 
July, the protests subsided and transformed back into a peaceful setting.   
On July 29, 2011, around 3,000 people attended a protest in Amman. One of the 
protesters, a member of the Constitutional Monarchy Movement, explained how the 
protest revealed how the movement is growing quickly in the northern area, referring to 
Irbid, Jerash, and Ajlun. Solovieva explains “protesters at the rally said the United States 
was inconsistent in its policy in the region and was ultimately causing more harm than 
good – it’s an old refrain, but one that has become more apparent since the Arab Spring 
sprung in January” (Solovieva). A lot of the protesters pointed their anger at the United 
States, as the United States started out as government supporters and slowly started 
allying with the rebels in different areas (Solovieva).  
 The seventh clash in 2011 between the protesters and the government supporters 
occurred on August 14, 2011. A government reform committee was set to present its 
constitutional reforms to the king, but the activists were unsatisfied with the proposed 
changes. There were forty-two proposed changes, which included “limiting the 
jurisdiction of military courts to only terrorism and espionage cases,” leaving out 
financial and corruption cases (“Proposed Changes”). The proposed changes also 
consisted of marginally expanding the powers of the elected parliament. The protesters 
were looking for change to increase the parliament’s power, but “the proposed changes to 
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the nearly 60-year-old constitution would still allow Jordan's monarch to retain most of 
his absolute powers” (“Proposed Reforms”). The reforms did not even cover the 
protesters’ concerns regarding an election for the prime minister. The clash did not 
produce as many injuries as the previous ones, but four people were still hurt in the 
altercation (“Proposed Reforms”).  
 In September of 2011, the protests died down for the most part, except for a few 
in regards to Israel. As a result of an anti-Israel demonstration, the staff at the Israeli 
embassy in Jordan was sent home. The group of activists “called for a ‘million-man 
march’ against the Israeli mission, part of a rising tide of anti-Israel protests in Jordan and 
in Egypt, the two Arab countries that have made peace with the Jewish state” (“Israel 
Evacuates”) Jordanian leftists, Islamists, and labor groups mobilized the protests looking 
for an end to the 1994 peace treaty held with Israel and the removal of the Israeli 
ambassador (“Israel Evacuates”).  
 At the end of September, over 4,000 Jordanians protested in Amman in response 
to a bill that was passed in the lower house that made corruption accusations without 
proof a crime. The protesters explained how they were enraged because “a government 
that is protecting corruption cannot be trusted, and a parliament of corruption does not 
represent the people” (Palazzolo). At the same time, the activists were provoked by King 
Abdullah II’s support for constitutional changes that formed an independent commission. 
The independent commission would be allowed to administer elections and restrain the 
authority of the military state security court. These constitutional changes were unpopular 
among Jordanians, as the military state security court would only be allowed to deal with 
“cases of high treason, espionage and terrorism,” leaving out corruption (Palazzolo). 
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Jordanians viewed these changes as a way to protect government corruption. Most 
importantly, the Jordanians were upset with the king’s failure to amend the constitution in 
allowing an elected prime minister (Palazzolo).  
 The protests reemerged on October 7, 2011 in Amman. Over 3,000 people 
attended the demonstration, which turned out as an anti-corruption march starting from 
the Al-Hussein mosque and ending at the town hall. Islamists and leftists led this 
demonstration, labeling themselves as The National Reform Front (NRF), which is the 
first time they mobilized a group as a partnership. “The demonstrators carried banners 
reading: ‘Political reform is the path to wiping out corruption…Corruption is the cause of 
poverty and unemployment’” (“Thousands Protest”). Whether in the form of political or 
financial corruption, the activists were looking to end it altogether (“Thousands Protest”).   
 A few days later, on October 15, 2011, the global “Occupy” movement hit Jordan 
in the city of Salhub. Outside the conference, “For Reforms and against Corruption,” pro 
government loyalists once again clashed with the peaceful protesters. The altercation 
became very violent when some of the loyalists threw stones at the protesters and even 
shot their guns into free space in hopes of breaking up the demonstration. “The event was 
organized to demand the resignation of Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit’s government and 
the dissolution of parliament for failing to carry out necessary political reform, the 
organizers of the gathering said” (“Pro-Regime”). Unfortunately, as a result of the clash, 
thirty-five people were hurt and twenty-seven cars were destroyed (“Pro-Regime”).  
 Throughout November and December a number of riots and protests took place 
throughout various cities in Jordan, including tribal towns. For example, on December 
24, 2011, activists engaged in a demonstration called “Friday to return lands.” Luck 
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writes, “activists claim ongoing corruption, privatization and the failure of the 
government to follow through on pledges to study various demands of return of wajihat-
state-owned lands, that were registered in the names of various tribes during the Ottoman 
era, are driving this Friday’s [December 24, 2011] protests” (Luck). The activists also 
protested in front of the office of the prime minister in response to the mistreatment of the 
demonstrators by the police previously in Mafraq. The Jordanian citizens were infuriated 
with the fact that the Jordanian police used tear gas to end an altercation between the 
protesters and the government loyalists (“Jordan Opposition”). 
 Until September of 2012, the protests subsided immensely. On September 1, 
2012, Jordanian citizens took to the streets again in the city of Amman. Similar to 
protests in the past, the activists were unhappy with the way King Abdullah II had 
reshuffled the cabinet and thus demanded that Jordan’s Prime Minister, Fayez Tarawneh, 
step down. Alongside the grievances about the prime minister, the Jordanian citizens 
were protesting about high fuel prices. The Muslim Brotherhood organized the protest 
and it was Jordan’s first big protest of 2012 (“Jordanian Protesters Stage Rallies”).  
A week later a clash occurred between the anti-riot forces and the protesters, yet 
again. The protesters started a demonstration in the city of Tafileh and started rallying 
against King Abdullah II.  One of the present activists, Fadi Abadeen, claimed, “as soon 
as we started using the words ‘royal palace’ and ‘regime,’ the police came at us with 
force, ” and the Jordanian security forces reportedly fired tear gas to break up the riot 
(“Clashes, Arrests”). The activists had the same goal of the first protest: demand that 
Prime Minister Fayez Tarawneh resign for his outrageous attempt to increase fuel prices. 
“Unlike neighboring countries, Jordan’s protest movement has long called for ‘regime 
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reform’ rather than ‘regime change,’ urging for a transfer of King Abdullah’s 
constitutional authority to form governments to the people” (“Clashes, Arrests”).   
Throughout the month of November in 2012, a series of major protests occurred 
across Jordan as a result of the increase in fuel prices. The first significant riot took place 
on November 13, 2012. During this riot, the protesters destroyed traffic lights and tires 
with fire, while the police tried to break up the chaos with tear gas and open fire. 
Demonstrators even set pictures of King Abdullah II on fire. “In Amman, thousands of 
demonstrators filled the circle outside the Interior Ministry near midnight, chanting, ‘The 
people want the fall of the regime,’” which is the first time the Jordanian citizens called 
for a regime change during their protests (Rudoren). Even a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood commented how the tension in Jordan was at its peak. Rudoren writes, “the 
eruption comes as King Abdullah has struggled to contain a growing and increasingly 
diverse opposition by introducing electoral reforms ahead of balloting scheduled for 
January and by establishing a constitutional court” (Rudoren). Essentially, the increase in 
gas prices sparked the November riots and protests, but Jordanian citizens were 
ultimately upset with the overall political and economic conditions that have remained 
stagnant (Rudoren). 
The “November Gust” protests continued until the 18th. These protests 
encompassed major riots with chants to take down the monarchy, even when the United 
States expressed its support for King Abdullah II. First-time protesters and supporters of 
the government even showed up to some of the demonstrations. For example, “in this 
affluent northern city [Irbid], usually a bulwark of support for the king, some 
demonstrators spoke openly of demands for democracy” (Kirkpatrick). One of the 
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protesters even expressed how the demonstrations have not just been about the rising 
prices of fuel. The activists were also concerned with democracy, corruption, and 
freedom (Kirkpatrick). The protests reached its peak on Friday, November 16, 2012 when 
the activists chanted, “‘Qaddafi, Ben Ali and Mubarak all left,’ referring to the former 
leaders of Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. “Abdullah, go, go” (Kirkpatrick). Out of thousands 
of people, 130 protesters were arrested for calling for an end to the monarchy. The 
November protests were violent and chaotic, but it sincerely spoke for the people (Jordan 
Islamists).  
Recently, in January of 2013, a number of protests have occurred leading up to 
parliamentiary elections in Jordan. On January 18, 2013, thousands gathered in Amman 
to protest the upcoming elections. Most of the protesters were among youth activists and 
the Muslim Brotherhood. “The Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan's largest opposition 
group, has renewed calls for King Abdullah to transfer his authority to appoint 
governments to the ‘people’, meaning an elected parliament” (“Thousands Call”). The 
protesters demanded reforms and more power for the people, as they were not fooled by 
the cosmetic elections with vote buying and election fraud. Protests were also taking 
place in Karak and Maan, where the activists were also boycotting the elections. “Pro-
democracy activists have called for constitutional reform that would transfer the 
monarch's authority, to appoint and dismiss governments, to parliament” (“Thousands 
Call”). With the upcoming election, the Jordanian citizens felt the need to protest as a 
way to facilitate actual reforms in Jordan (“Thousands Call”).  
Jordan’s Response 
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The analysis of Jordan’s protests from 2011 to 2013 point to a regime change, but 
Jordan’s monarchy continues to endure until this day. The government has responded to 
the protests in various ways over the past few years to ensure a lasting regime under King 
Abdullah II. The first response occurred on February 1, 2011, when King Abdullah II 
reshuffled his government. His first step was to fire Prime Minister Samir Rifai and 
replace him with Marouf al-Bakhit. Al-Bakhit had served in the past under King Abullah 
II, but the king considered him to be a good choice, as he was seen to be clean of 
corruption (“King of Jordan”) 
King Abdullah has reshuffled his government before, but this was the first time he 
had made this action in response to anti-government protests. Kadri and Bronner write, 
“the palace statement said Mr. Bakhit would have the task of ‘taking practical, swift and 
tangible steps to launch a real political reform process, in line with the king’s version of 
comprehensive reform, modernization and development.’” King Abdullah II also thought 
Mr. Bakhit was a good alternative to Rifai because trade unions and the Muslim 
Brotherhood were upset with the prime minister’s focus on technocrats and businesses, 
rather than focusing on the citizens’ concerns. Although many Jordanians were still 
unhappy with this choice, “some protest leaders were cautiously positive. Nahed Hattar, a 
leftist activist, said in a telephone interview that he considered the change a good move 
but that he wanted to see the government program before rendering judgment” (“King of 
Jordan”). King Abdullah II also promised the inclusion of the Islamic Action Front and 
Islamists into the new government. He kept this promise and on February 10, 2011, one 
Islamist and a total of five leftists were sworn into the new Jordanian cabinet (“Middle 
East Protests”) 
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To follow up with the government change, the government created a 225 million 
dollar reduction package in fuel prices and staples, specifically sugar and rice. The prime 
minister also increased wages for civil servants and the army (“Thousands Call”). With 
these government changes, King Abdullah II called for immediate changes of the laws 
regarding politics and civil freedoms (Wong). “Reform initiatives included convening a 
national dialogue committee in March, and appointing a royal committee to revise the 
constitution in April. The committees proposed modest reforms to the electoral system, 
and significant reforms to the constitution, though they left out guarantees for gender 
equality” (“World Report 2012”).  
King Abdullah created the first tangible law reform on February 15, 2011 when 
he revised the Public Gatherings Law. The reform allows citizens to mobilize civil 
demonstrations or meetings without the permission of the government. The Public 
Gatherings Law still requires Jordanian citizens to notify authorities of any demonstration 
or meeting two days prior to the event and they must abide by public order. The 
government claimed that it would not interfere in any protest or meeting, but security 
forces would still need to guarantee public safety. Halaby writes, “about 3,000 tribal 
leaders and key figures—including lawmakers, retired security personnel and 
academicians – renewed their allegiance to the king in an emotional letter, praising his 
reform efforts,” which reveals King Abdullah made a step in the right direction in order 
to ensure the safety of his monarchy (Schwartz).  
 In March of 2011, the “National Dialogue Committee” (NDC) was officially 
created to reform electoral laws and political parties. Jordanian citizens have long been 
upset with the electoral law formed in 1993, which only allows for one vote, therefore 
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limiting the influence of Islamist and leftist groups in parliament. “The NDC-proposed 
electoral law provides for a two-tier system, with 115 deputies elected at the district level 
and 15 seats reserved for national lists. SNTV [1993 electoral law] is scrapped for an 
open proportional list system, which will give a boost to opposition parties and 
particularly the IAF” (“How Stable”). The new electoral law still presents an issue for 
rural and tribal regions because it does not address the problem of gerrymandering. Often 
times, “rural and tribal areas are given disproportionate weight at the expense of 
predominantly Palestinian cities like Amman and Zarqa” (“How Stable”). 
On March 28, 2011, shortly after the first clash between government supporters 
and protesters, King Abdullah II called for a national unity day. The king stated, "what 
matters to us in this stage is that our national unity must not be undermined" and "we are 
proceeding in earnest with the political reform process and we have nothing to fear” 
(CNN). He expressed optimistic thoughts for a bright future in Jordan with the various 
economic and developmental programs they were working on, such as projects on health 
and education that are compatible for the Petra district. For example, “the premier, who 
reviewed the government’s achievements and plans in different fields, said the 
government is working on electronically linking Queen Rania Hospital in the district with 
Prince Hamzah Hospital to promote telemedicine” (Ghazal). With the various injuries in 
the altercation at the protest, King Abdullah II touched upon the need to refrain from 
violent actions that could harm national unity. The king ended his speech with his 
promises for economic and political reform (Ghazal). 
 Later on, in June of 2011, King Abdullah II spoke about his promise to reform the 
election process, where the cabinets will be created based on the majority of an elected 
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parliament. The king did not specify when exactly he would give up his appointment 
powers, but this was “the first time he has made such a concession publicly to his 
citizens, and follows six months of protests” (“Jordan’s King Abdullah”). Most 
Jordanians claimed that the king did not give a permanent date as to when he would make 
this reform because he wanted to see a change in the political parties, specifically the 
merging of thirty-three political parties into three distinct parties. Other than the king’s 
unexpected vow for elected cabinets, he claimed that he would be revising more laws in 
regard to the election and political parties to quell Jordanians’ grievances (“Jordan’s King 
Abdullah”).  
 In August of 2011, King Abdullah II appointed a committee to propose 
constitutional amendments. These amendments included the creation of a constitutional 
court, an independent commission for elections, the improvement of civil liberties, the 
restraint of the State Security Court, the restriction of temporary laws without parliament, 
and the government limitation to dissolve parliament. All of these proposed amendments 
had various purposes to develop Jordan. For example, the constitutional court was 
proposed, “to monitor the constitutionality of laws and regulations. The court replaces a 
high tribunal for the interpretation of such laws that was headed by the speaker of the 
Senate and widely considered less than totally independent” and the independent 
commission was proposed to “oversee elections instead of the Ministry of Interior that 
has previously been in charge of the electoral process. All electoral contestations will be 
referred to the judiciary instead of parliament” (Muasher 1). The enhancement of civil 
liberties was proposed as an amendment to criminalize rights and public freedom 
violations, as well as torture in all forms. The committee suggested restraining the State 
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Security Court’s “jurisdiction to cases of high treason, espionage, and terrorism, with 
citizens being otherwise tried in civilian courts; this includes ministers, who were 
previously tried by a parliamentary high tribunal” (Muasher 1). Finally, the committee 
proposed to limit the government capability of issuing temporary laws without parliament 
and dissolving parliament because Jordan’s king frequently abused this power in the past 
(Muasher 1).  
Jordan’s constitution was officially amended in May and October of 2012, but 
only the establishment of an independent election commission and a constitutional court 
and was passed from the proposed list (Muasher 2). The Independent Election 
Commission was created in May of 2012. King Abdullah II announced, “we rely on this 
commission to usher in a new era in Jordan’s political history, an era characterised with 
balance between the branches of government and steady improvement in the performance 
of Parliament and political parties” (“Creation of Independent”). He also explained how 
the main purpose of the Independent Election Commission was to supervise and run all 
parts of elections with regards to international standards (“Creation of Independent”). 
The constitutional court was amended in October and issued to replace the Higher 
Council for the Interpretation of the Constitution (HCIC). The king considered the 
establishment of a constitutional court to be a national achievement. “Article 59 of the 
Constitution states that “the Constitutional Court shall monitor the constitutionality of 
laws and regulations in force and issue its judgments in the name of the King” and  “the 
Constitutional Court “has the right to interpret the provisions of the Constitution if 
requested, either by virtue of a decision of the Council of Ministers or by a resolution 
taken by the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies passed by an absolute majority” (JT). 
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Furthermore, King Abdullah II explained how the Constitutional Court would balance the 
branches of government (JT).  
 On October 17, 2011, Jordan’s Prime Minister, Marouf Al-Bakhit, officialy 
resigned after the majority of parliamentarians requested for the end of his reign. Aside 
from pressure from Jordanian citizens, the parliamentarians believed that Al-Bakhit was 
unable to stabilize dialogue with the opposition groups, such as the Islamists and the 
leftist groups. The king replaced Marouf Al-Bakhit with Awn al-Khasawneh, a widely 
known judge of the Hague-based International Court of Justice. This appointment 
“reinforces Abdullah's stated intentions of instituting reforms. The measures could 
include decentralization, fighting corruption, giving more independence to parliament 
and inviting the opposition into the government” (“Jordan’s Marouf”).  
Abdullah was pleased with his choice for the new prime minister because al-
Khasawneh is an older liberal and had a good relationship with opposition groups, 
specifically the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition, al-Khasawneh had a clean record when 
Abdullah II appointed him. “Abdullah told al-Khasawneh to launch an ‘effective and 
constructive dialogue with all political groups,’ according to a designation letter obtained 
from the Royal Palace” (“Jordan’s Marouf”). The king also demanded that the new prime 
minster focus on revising the parliamentary election law, where the Islamist opposition 
group would not be undermined with a disproportionate number of seats. Normally the 
king does not follow through with legal reforms, but the announcement was a significant 
response to the citizens. Furthermore, the king called for a resolution to the corruption 
problem in government, as well as an independent council that could administer the 
parliamentary elections in 2013. Lastly, Abdullah II replaced Jordan’s intelligence chief, 
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Mohammed Raqqad, with Faisal Shobaki after various complaints were made about 
Raqqad’s intimidation methods. This was a huge step for Jordan’s monarchy in 
attempting to reform the government, which has helped keep the regime alive (“Jordan’s 
Marouf”).  
Awn al-Khasawneh did not last very long under Jordan’s regime. In April of 
2012, Al-Khasawneh resigned from office due to failed reforms. Jordanian citizens were 
unhappy with the lack of improvements in Jordan, as well as “proposed electoral reforms 
in the western-backed kingdom that were seen by critics as an assault on civil liberties” 
(Black). The proposed election law was drafted for the purposes of limiting the amount of 
seats opposition groups would be able to sustain in parliament, such as the Islamic Action 
Front. King Abdullah II was accused of reshuffling his cabinet just to keep the rebellions 
under control. Even so, King Abdullah II replaced al-Khasawneh with a former prime 
minister from the 1990s, Fayez al-Tarawneh. "The king has shuffled cabinets and then 
shuffled them again, using prime ministers as buffers to absorb popular discontent” and 
he has charged committees to explore possible reforms, but these remain largely 
unimplemented” (Black). Regardless, even with the past uprisings in Jordan since 2011, 
King Abdullah II’s monarchy seems fairly stable and most of the protests have called for 
reforms rather than a regime change (Boghani).  
In October of 2012, King Abdullah II dissolved his parliament and announced his 
plans for early elections (Boghani). Abdullah Ensour was chosen as the new prime 
minister of Jordan to create a new government (Khadder). The king did not provide an 
exact date for early elections, but he planned on organizing the polls before 2013. He 
made this announcement after he vowed to implement new political laws and revise old 
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ones, as a way to deal with the anti-government protests. “Abdullah II said recently that 
the new parliament will elect a prime minister next year, instead of following the 
country's tradition until now of the king appointing the premier” (Boghani). This 
sentiment has helped quell the protests and a call for a regime change, even though 
Jordanians have heard the king make this statement in the past. Many groups still planned 
on performing peaceful demonstrations after the king had made a call for a new 
government, but they were still optimistic that the king could help build a brighter future 
for Jordan. For example, Nimer Assaf, a leader of the Islamic Action Front, explained, 
“we do not look for names, we look for the deeds, and we hope that this next government 
will go ahead with reforms which the Jordanians have been asking for a very long time” 
(Khadder). Overall, the king’s attempt at reforms has left Jordanians with an optimistic 
outlook for the monarchy. 
King Abdullah II did not end up holding elections before the end of 2012, but 
recently, in January of 2013, the king has made attempts to deal with reforms for the 
parliamentary elections on January 23, 2013. On January 9, 2013, the king called a 
meeting to deal with election corruption. The meeting was held specifically in concern to 
vote buying and a number of other election crimes. King Abdullah II met with the 
Independent Elections Commission to deal with the problems at hand and he explained 
Jordan’s national duty to tackle the issue of political money. The king explained how he 
wanted the Independent Elections Commission to take full measures in guaranteeing fair 
and neutral elections with transparency. In order to reach this goal, the king demanded 
the supervision of local and international groups over elections. “During the meeting, IEC 
President Abdul Ilah Khatib noted that the monitoring body, which was established under 
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a Royal Decree and a constitutional provision, has been working to build a reputation as a 
highly professional and neutral entity that employs the best international practices in 
election management” (“King Calls”). The monarch and the Independent Elections 
Commission claimed to have worked hard in the meeting to ensure that Jordan begins 
2013 with a new political life era (“King Calls) 
 To further ensure Jordan’s goal of fair elections, “the board has endorsed a 
number of executive instructions regulating the election stages from registration to ballot 
sorting to announcing the results” (“King Calls”). The board of commissioners will then 
provide the king with an elections report on the Independent Elections Commissions’ 
ability to hold elections. The detailed report will also provide the board’s improvement 
suggestions for future elections and laws. The local and international agencies also 
provided voters with election information in concern to the polls and process, in order to 
improve the pace and organization of elections. Lastly, the Independent Elections 
Commission created a training program for the commission’s staff. “The IEC has been 
open to all sectors of society and is keen on building a fruitful partnership with all 
stakeholders that would enhance people’s confidence in the commission and the steps it 
takes to protect voters’ right to free choice” (“King Calls”). The monarchy and the 
Independent Election Commission may not have been sincere in its reforms, but 
nonetheless pledged to ensure free and proper elections for Jordanian citizens to keep the 
regime stable (“King Calls”).  
 King Abdullah II made a following announcement on January 17
th
 regarding the 
fairness of elections. He explained the outline for a transparent and democratic transition. 
He claimed, “the new prime minister after next Wednesday’s elections will be designated 
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based on consultations with the majority coalition of parliamentary blocs. If no clear 
majority emerges in the next Lower House, the designation will be ‘based upon 
consultation with all parliamentary blocs’” (“Making Our”). King Abdullah II expressed 
his optimism for the upcoming election and his willingness to reform the process for the 
next election after observing any mistakes the new system might have. He considered this 
to be a huge step towards democracy and a parliamentary government, even though these 
were most likely announcements to quell protesters (“Making Our”).  
Lastly, the king set three conditions to guarantee an effective parliamentary 
government. These three conditions included “‘true national parties that aggregate 
specific and local interests into a national platform for action,’” “the kingdom’s civil 
service should ‘further develop its professional, impartial non-political abilities to support 
and advice,’” and “‘a change in parliamentary conventions’” (“Making Our”). In concern 
to the change in parliamentary conventions, King Abdullah II explained how these 
reforms would change how parliament works and support a full parliamentary 
government. The formation of Governments will ultimately be guided by parliamentary 
bloc consultations, where they will discuss common policy platforms. “Opposition parties 
will similarly need to agree on conventions for how they cooperate in holding the 
Government to account and offer an alternate vision – their role is just as crucial for 
successful Government” (Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein). King Abdullah II claimed that he 
believed these conditions would ensure a supportive parliament that communicates well 
with him (“Making Our”) 
 On January 18, 2013, the king held another meeting to discuss reforms and 
election process. The king met with public figures, such as Islamist leaders, the previous 
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chief and minister of the Royal Court, and Adnan Bakhit, as well as many other top 
politicians. “On political reform, he [King Abudullah II] stressed the importance of 
working with parliamentary blocs after the January 23 elections, adding that the coming 
stage, which will witness the emergence of parliamentary governments, will be very vital 
in Jordan’s political history” (“Middle East and North Africa”). The meeting also 
addressed various developments and projects across Jordan, such as ones to improve 
energy conservation. The king took various concerns among the attendees into 
consideration, such as social equality and government trust. The meeting was viewed as a 
step towards Jordan’s progress and reforms (“Middle East and North Africa”). Aside 
from the meeting, the king published a couple of political treatises to facilitate public 
debate and motivate Jordanian citizens to vote in the elections (“Elections, Parliament”).  
 Prior to parliamentary elections, Jordan’s regime passed a new electoral law. The 
new law established a two-ballot vote. With the two-ballot vote, voters are able to vote 
twice: “one for representatives from local districts and one for candidates competing 
under a proportional representation at the national level” (Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood). 
Opposition groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, were not pleased with this reform 
because “an increase of seats allocated for party candidates in the 140-strong lower house 
of parliament – from 17 to 27- is not enough” (Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood). Also, the 
Muslim Brotherhood claimed that the new law would favor tribal candidates in the local 
district (Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood). Overall, opposition groups were disappointed 
with the new electoral law and considered it to be an enhancement for the king, rather 
than the people.  
                                                                                                                                       Berger 51 
 Jordan’s parliamentary elections were officially held on January 23, 2013. Once 
again, government supporters, also known as loyalists, won the majority of seats in 
Jordan’s parliament. The Islamic Action Front boycotted the elections, as it was 
unsatisfied with the election rules and vote buying. Even so, Islamists and leftists still 
won seats and “international observers who monitored the elections noted improvements 
over previous votes” (Fahim). The National Democratic Institute provided fifty members 
to observe the voting process and ensure safety from election corruption. Many Jordanian 
citizens were still upset with the outcome of the election and vowed to continue 
protesting, but Jordan’s regime still continues to endure with King Abdullah II (Fahim).  
 Most recently, on March 9, 2013, Jordan’s parliament was given the ability to 
choose the prime minister for “the first time in the country’s history that the legislature 
rather than the king has decided who will be head of government” (Jordan’s Parliament). 
Abdullah Ensour, previously a liberal lawmaker, was elected as the new prime minister 
of Jordan by parliament. King Abdullah II claimed that he would allow Ensour to remain 
in office for the next four years. “King Abdullah II formally confirmed Ensour's 
appointment. Abdullah has in the past selected prime ministers, but he relinquished that 
right as part of the reform package announced last year” (“Jordan’s Parliament”).  
Theories 
 To this day, scholars debate the reasons as to why Jordan’s regime still stands 
even after the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring did not hit Jordan in the same way as 
countries like Tunisia and Egypt. Jordan has seen a rise in protests over the last few years 
after the Arab Spring occurred, but the monarchy still continues to endure. Most of these 
arguments fall under the topic of religious, economical, political, and social reasons. 
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  When looking at religious reasons, some theorists point to the idea of traditional 
legitimacy. Burger explains how Jordan’s monarchy has been extremely stable. He 
revealed much of its strength over the past three decades. Most of the protesters did not 
even try to take down Jordan’s monarchy. Rather the majority of the protests in Jordan 
called for reforms instead of a regime change (Burger 7). Burger reveals how Jordan’s 
monarchy still stands after the Arab Spring because the citizens believe in the 
monarchy’s legitimacy, as the regime is rooted in early history. “Tracing back their 
origins through Islamic lineage to Prophet Mohammad provides the Hashemites with an 
incontestable source of legitimacy and gives them quasi-religious authority rendering 
criticism against them equal to blasphemy” (Burger 8). Jordan’s monarchy itself uses this 
role to upgrade the regime and ensure its stability. For example, Jordan’s monarchy will 
highlight its position in the 1916 Great Arab Revolt, where the great-great-grandfather of 
King Abdullah II, Sharif Al-Hussein bin Ali, organized the revolt against the Ottomans. 
“This strategy was successful: blogger and activist Naseem Tarawnah states that ‘loyalty 
to the king is seen as loyalty to the country. They are intertwined and people sometimes 
have difficulty separating the two’” (Burger 8).  
Even opposition groups, such as the Islamic Action Front, believe it has a 
religious duty to maintain the Jordanian monarchy (Burger 8). This strategy was proven 
extremely successful during the protests when King Abdullah II held various celebrations 
for Jordan, such as Jordan’s 65th anniversary of independence, Army Day, and the Great 
Arab Revolt anniversary. “According to reports, this mass event ‘voiced support for 
progress in the country and reiterated loyalty to Jordan under the leadership of His 
Majesty the King” (Burger 15). Also, the king visited tribal areas to secure his support 
                                                                                                                                       Berger 53 
through royal favors, such as makrama. Makrama has a historical meaning behind it that 
symbolizes a gift, which is rooted in traditional legitimacy. This was proven to be a 
success when the king did not meet many protests in Tafileh (Burger 16). Horres agrees 
with Burger and argues protesters were only looking for reforms within the regime due to 
the royal family’s monopoly on power through the legitimacy of the monarchy (Horres 
141). Overall, Jordan’s monarchy is deeply rooted in history, preserving its stability 
through legitimacy (Burger 8).  
 Aside from religious reasons, economic arguments have been debated among 
theorists as to why the Jordan monarchy still remains intact. One argument includes the 
creation of jobs, mainly in the public sector, and the flow of aid to the population (Burger 
8). Horres explains how foreign aid in Jordan serves as a “lubricant to ease political 
tensions” (Horres 155). She also argues that foreign aid has been helpful, but it has only 
been working with the use of political reforms as well, in order to satisfy the protesters, 
which makes Jordan’s monarchy distinct from Bahrain’s monarchy (Horres 155). Jordan 
relies on the influx of foreign aid to the population in order to keep the regime stable, as 
the country is unable to rely on its limited resources within the country. This political 
strategy has become known as a “top down” allocation with the use of foreign aid. Jordan 
has created economic liberalization programs over the years, but the king has never 
privatized state entities. Burger explains, “full privatization would have led to the 
dismissal of workers from previously state-owned enterprises; this would have 
jeopardized peoples’ acceptance of the rulers and was thus avoided.” Overall Burger 
believes Jordanian citizens have been essentially bought off to keep them from 
overturning the regime (Burger 8). 
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           Similar to this approach, Ritcher explains how Jordan relies on material resources, 
such as phosphate and potash exports to remain stable. Rather than just buying off the 
population, Ritcher portrays how the material resources are allocated to a defense and 
security budget, as well as public wages and pensions. In times of fiscal scarcity, the 
material distribution has supported the endurance of Jordan’s monarchy. Jordan’s regime 
has even been able to reduce external price shocks due to increasing production capacity 
(Ritcher 17). Overall, Ritcher argues the distribution of material resources as the main 
source of Jordan’s authoritarian durability.  
 Peters and Moore take the argument of foreign aid one-step further and explain 
how Jordan’s “supply and demand” strategy allows the regime to maintain durability. 
“The Jordanian rentier state is not exclusively a product of external rents, particularly 
foreign aid, but also of the demands of the coalition encompassing groups with highly 
disparate economic policy preferences” (Peters and Moore 256). Through distributive 
institutions, Jordan makes rent-fueled side payments to coalition members (Peters and 
Moore 256). The purpose of the distributive institutions is to sustain a heterogeneous 
coalition, consisting of Transjordanian tribes and a Syrian/pre-1967 Palestinian based 
merchant elite (Peters and Moore 257). “Assisted by geopolitically motivated donors, the 
Hashemites have adapted institutions over time to tap a diverse supply of rents that range 
from economic and military aid to protocol trade, allowing them to retain power through 
periods of late development, domestic political crisis, and neoliberal conditionality” 
(Peters and Moore 256). The side payments and distribution of rents have come as a 
result of delayed development, brutal civil clashes, changing demographics, and 
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neoliberalism. The modified distribution institutions “explain authoritarian durability in a 
small state of significant geostrategic value to external patrons” (Peters and Moore 257).  
 Many scholars argue in favor of political reasons. One of these arguments 
includes legal reasons, such as the creation of laws and reforms, as to why Jordan’s 
regime continues to endure. This has helped quell the protests in Jordan and satisfy some 
demands (Burger 9). Cautious reforms have allowed Jordan’s monarchy to remain stable 
(Bauer and Schiller 1). Burger reveals how the recent reforms and laws enacted by the 
king were similar to the ones in the past in response to protests. For example, “elections 
and parliamentary activity was reintroduced in 1989. Yet, the election laws of 1989, 1993 
and 2001 were designed in a way that allowed the regime to control the parliament’s 
composition while keeping the electoral process legitimate in the eyes of the voters and 
the international community” (Burger 9). Not to mention the Political Parties Law was 
enacted in 1992, which still exists today, but the opposition parties barely have power as 
they are extremely factionalized. The goal of these various laws and reforms were 
implemented to allow opposition parties to blow off steam through political pluralism 
(Burger 9). “This fosters the perception that the purpose of these legal-formal actions was 
again only window dressing to manifest commitment to democratic reform without 
actually changing the regime structure” (Burger 17). The revision of the recent Public 
Gathering Law is one that proves this argument. In the end, the activists do not end up 
calling for a regime change because they are content with reforms (Burger 9).  
 Symbolism is also an argument under political reasons for the endurance of 
Jordan’s monarchy post Arab Spring. Burger argues that “the use of democratic language 
or discourses to distract from undemocratic rule, symbolic acts and decisions, and the 
                                                                                                                                       Berger 56 
framing of the royal family as above the political fray” are symbolic mechanisms that 
allow Jordan’s monarchy to endure (Burger 9). For example, King Abdullah frequently 
uses democratic language in his speeches, such as the need for democracy as a “national 
and unwavering choice” (Burger 9). This use of democratic language implies that the 
king will make reforms, but most of the time he does not follow through with tangible 
reforms. The king has also been able to push aside political reforms through the focus on 
economic development. These actions have prevented criticism of the king. Lastly, 
through these mechanisms, the king presents himself as non-partisan and blames the 
government for unpopular reforms, rather than the royal family (Burger 9-10). For 
example, King Abdullah blamed his Prime Minister Mr. Bakhit for the lack of reforms 
after facing public pressure in concern to the reforms (Burger 18). Burger writes, “it is 
again a tool to portray the king’s responsiveness to public demands by using politicians 
as scapegoats for political and economic aberrations without having to take 
responsibility” (Burger 9-10).  
 In addition to reforms and symbolism, the strategy of inclusion is also seen as a 
political reason for the endurance of Jordan post Arab Spring. Over time the king has 
included business elites into the regime. “The King created the Economic Consultative 
Council (ECC) as an institutionalized stepping-stone for young, Western-oriented 
business men. Via the ECC, they gradually acquired offices in the government” (Burger 
11). This step has included political elites into parliament, where opposition becomes 
more institutionalized, and thus more controllable. Political elites will still be 
oppositional, but they are more loyal once they become part of parliament (Burger 11). 
Conrad points out how past kings have even included the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
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legislature and gave them concessions when they became an increasing threat to the 
regime (Conrad 1). “The Muslim Brotherhood stopped criticizing the regime in public 
and rallying people to its cause when it was given some say over policy in the legislature. 
King Hussein’s decision to bring the group into the political process resulted in their 
demands being announced within the confines of the existing institutional regime” 
(Conrad 18). The inclusion strategy came in handy when the protests occurred in Jordan. 
Many of the oppositional political elites were still in favor of a legitimate constitutional 
monarchy, but they stayed loyal to the royal family. Regardless, oppositional forces in 
parliament still protested in Jordan, but “inclusionary legitimation ensured the acceptance 
of the rulers by economic or political elites and served to either strengthening the support 
base by promoting certain figures or to broaden the support base by bringing new elites 
into the system” (Burger 11).   
A widely used political argument among scholars for Jordan’s endurance is the 
strategy of divide and rule. This is done through elite rotation, magnifying societal 
cleavages, undermining oppositional demands, and creating structural restrictions. 
Through elite rotation, King Abdullah II has appointed many different prime ministers to 
keep Jordanians content. Elite rotation has been occurring since Jordan’s independence in 
1946 and most recently in the past few years since the Arab Spring. Burger writes, 
“individual ministers or entire cabinets have been dismissed by the king without ever 
changing the basic political structure significantly. The pool of recruitment, however, 
stays the same” (Burger 12). Most of the time, prime ministers are just reinstated or 
reshuffled. Jordan’s king uses this strategy to appease Jordanian citizens when they are 
unhappy with the corruption or the political situations in the country. The protesters have 
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recently been calling for elected prime ministers, but to this day, the strategy of elite 
rotation has worked for the most part (Burger 12). Aside from elite rotation, the Jordanian 
government exacerbates societal cleavages as a part of their divide and rule strategy.  
“The Transjordanian-Palestinian issue is the societal cleavage used the most for dividing 
the population as well as opposition. Basically, Palestinian Jordanians are considered by 
Transjordanians to be “less Jordanian” and thus less loyal to the royal family and the 
state” (Burger 13). On top of the Transjordanian-Palestinan cleavage, there is a divide in 
Jordan among government supporters and government opponents, and ultimately the 
regime loyalists silence the criticizing voices of the opponents. The societal cleavages 
“[have] rendered the Jordanian opposition weak and fragmented” (Burger 13).  
 To further explain the divide and rule strategy, Burger articulates the 
government’s actions to undermine oppositional demands. King Abdullah II will 
undermine oppositional demands by regarding them as outdated ideas and ideologies. At 
times, King Abdullah II will also turn oppositional demands into his own by calling for 
reforms on his own. “Although this does not often translate into legislation, the king can 
thereby claim to take care of these issues and that further protests by the opposition are 
only intended to disturb public order since, from his point of view, he is taking care of it” 
(Burger 13). Lastly, structural restrictions are part of the divide and rule strategy. The 
Jordanian government applies restrictions in a few different ways. Firstly, the Jordanian 
regime limits freedoms on the media and association, which weaken the voice of 
opposition groups (Burger 13). It is also evident that the elections law restrains 
opposition groups from gaining spots in parliament and prevents “parties from 
consolidating into broader blocs” (Burger 14).  
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Furthermore, the government brought forward loyal businessmen as a growing 
influence to weaken parliament and developed the ECC into a parallel government under 
King Abdullah II’s control. “This allowed him to counterbalance the conventional 
institutions ensuring their weakness and his ultimate control over political decision 
making” (Burger 14). In addition, King Abdullah uses his ability to dissolve parliament 
and postpone elections when opposition groups start to gain more influence (Burger 14). 
The divide and rule strategy allows King Abdullah II to maintain power, as he reshuffles 
parliament, exacerbates societal cleavages, undermines opposition demands, and weakens 
opposition groups through restrictions and marginalization. 
 Pluralism and the toleration of limited dissent are also viewed as political 
arguments for the endurance of Jordan’s monarchy. This political strategy has allowed 
Jordan’s regime to turn “radical resistance into controlled opposition. As such, pluralist 
policies function as valuable mechanisms of social control rather than instruments of 
collective empowerment” (Boukhars 3). When political opposition groups channel their 
dissent, Jordan’s monarchy is better able to assess the magnitude of opposition in regards 
to their policies and the probability of the opposition turning into militancy (Boukhars 3). 
Overall, Jordan’s political strategy of pluralism has allowed the regime to control 
opposition groups and prevent radical resistance.  
 Finally, some scholars have favored of the “threat” argument under political 
reasons. Burger portrayed how the threat of chaos without the monarchy discourages 
people from protesting or calling for a regime change. “The Hashemites portray 
themselves as indispensable for Jordan’s well being because of their claimed role as 
mediators between rivaling groups. It is stipulated that without the royal family, Jordan 
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would head directly into chaos and the aforementioned rivalries would lead to violent 
power struggles” (Burger 11). Many Jordanian citizens believe that a violent power 
struggle would occur in their country between rivalries, such as Northern tribes versus 
Southern tribes and Palestinians versus Transjordanians, if the royal family were taken 
down. Jordan’s monarchy even highlights how Western powers or its neighboring 
countries could control their country without the royal family in place. Ultimately, many 
Jordanian citizens choose not to call for a regime change because they fear life will 
become chaotic in their country without the monarchy in place (Burger 11).  
 With regards to social reasons, some scholars argue that the rising status of the 
middle class in Jordan and “aspiring cosmopolitanism” strengthens the regime. These 
notions have created a new structure of social organization in Jordan’s capital. “This 
reorients the populace away from failed political reforms and serves as a means to 
reinforce the status-quo, particularly in the context of deepening internal divisions and a 
region in turmoil” (Tobin 96). The rising notion of “aspiring cosmopolitanism” in Jordan 
has come as a result of the creation of neoliberal economic reforms. Over the years there 
have been a rising number of Jordanians from East Amman traveling to West Amman in 
hopes of work and leisure activity, which has led to an increase in employment in the 
service sector and private commercial spaces. “In such spaces, both East and West 
Ammanis prioritize cosmopolitan constructs of economic, political, and cultural forms of 
sociality that closely resemble those of the elites. They emphasize inclusiveness and 
democracy rather than ‘internecine conflict, resurgent nationalism, and all sorts of bloody 
‘othering,’” (Tobin 98-99).  
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Notions of cosmopolitanism have been shaped through employment in the service 
sector and leisure activities in commercial areas, such as coffee shops, which allows 
middle class Jordanians to model themselves after elites as “aspiring cosmopolitans.” 
Overall, “the middle-class orientation has emerged as a king of imagined community 
displacing overtly political nationalism and replacing ethnic, religious and other forms of 
elitism, factioning and sectarianism with a class-based cohesion that still carries 
important political implications” (Tobin 100). King Abdullah II has been able to use the 
rise of cosmopolitanism and social cohesion as a way to avoid radical protests. For 
example, King Abdullah II has made various announcements calling for an end to 
protests that can disrupt the unity of Jordan. Ultimately, the notion of cosmopolitanism 
has united the Jordanian middle class and elites, allowing the Hashemite regime to use 
the preservation of unity to its advantage in averting revolution (Tobin 105).    
 Throughout the Arab Spring, Jordan’s monarchy has been able to endure. Various 
protests have occurred in Jordan over the past few years, but due to religious, 
economical, political, and social reasons, Jordan’s monarchy remains stable. Overall, 
most Jordanian citizens are just looking for reforms under the regime, rather than a 
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Chapter 2: Algeria 
 
Following the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, protests began to occur in Algeria 
in December of 2010. The major protests took place in the capital, while a number of 
other minor protests spread across the country. Inspired by the Arab Spring, Algeria has 
faced many demonstrations over the last few years, however, the regime continues to 
endure as a result of historical events, presidential tactics, military repression, and 
economic reasons.  
Algeria’s Regime  
 Algeria, formally known as the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, 
operates as a semi-presidential republic. Abdelaziz Bouteflika is the current president of 
Algeria and rules the National Liberation Front (FLN) (Migdalovitz 1). “Today, Algeria 
has a bicameral parliament, encompassing a directly elected 380-member lower house, 
the National Assembly, and a partly appointed and partly indirectly elected upper 
chamber, the Council of the Nation” (Zoubir 180). The president has the power to appoint 
the majority of the Council of the Nation, while local and regional assemblies are given 
the authority to elect two-thirds of the Council. According to the constitution of 1996, 
Bouteflika was supposed to serve two terms as president, but Bouteflika himself 
introduced constitutional amendments that were approved by parliament in November of 
2008, allowing him to stay in power for more than two terms (Zoubir 181).  
 The security forces make up a major part of Algeria’s regime. This includes 
Algeria’s security services and military hierarchy. “In 1999, Foreign Minister Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika, a civilian with vital military backing, won the presidential election after all 
other candidates withdrew, charging fraud” (Migdalovitz 1). Ultimately, Algeria’s 
                                                                                                                                       Berger 63 
security forces remain completely loyal to the regime and support President Bouteflika 
through rigged elections. Bouteflika still has some autonomy from the military and the 
ability to remove senior officers if he chooses to do so. “Bouteflika now serves as both 
commnder in chief and minister of defense. Following his reelection to a second term in 
April 2004, Bouteflika strengthened his control over the armed forces by appointing a 
close associate as secretary-general of the Ministry of Defense and appointing other 
loyalists as heads of Algeria’s six military regions” (Zoubir 188).  
Regardless of Bouteflika’s power over the security forces the military still has 
significant strength over the population, due to the past civil wars, Islamist threat, and 
war on terrorism. Through these engagements, the security services, the Department of 
Intelligence and Security (DRS), preside over various appointments of ministers and 
ambassadors (Zoubir 188). This group manipulates sectors of society, such as the media 
and political parties, in order to ensure election results. They also hold significant power 
in state affairs  (Zoubir 189). Ultimately, “while the role of the armed forces has greatly 
diminished, elected officials – including the chief executive—do not have final say over 
legislation and policy, given the political weight of the DRS” (Zoubir 189).  
 The pro-government parties that dominate parliament together make up the 
“Presidential Alliance” (Zoubir 189). These parties include the National Liberation Front 
(FLN), Democratic National Rally (RND), and the Islamist MSP. The FLN holds the 
majority of seats in parliament (Zoubir 189). Even with pro-government parties operating 
in parliament, Bouteflika still buys off the groups with major salary increases before the 
elections to ensure his stability as leader of Algeria (Zoubir 181). “Political parties—
secular and religious--- exist, but they have no aspiration to accede to power. They are 
                                                                                                                                       Berger 64 
content with having representatives in the parliament in part because a portion of their 
salaries goes to the parties’ coffers” (Zoubir 182).  
The original oppositional figures were among radical Islamists, Louisa Hanoune’s 
Workers’ Party, and the General Union of Algerian Workers. “Since the civil war of the 
1990s, the regime has successively neutered both of the main Islamist parties, allowing 
them to participate in elections and including them in governing coalitions, tempting 
them with the fruits of power, and then watching their support slump as they compromise 
to stay in Parliament” (J. Brown). Today there are a number of moderate Islamist political 
parties in Algeria’s parliament, such as MSP, Isah, and En-Nahda (Zoubir 189). 
Hanoune’s Workers’ Party was a main oppositional force in the 1990s, but has since 
transformed into a supporter of the Algerian regime. The General Union of Algerian 
Workers was a main opposition force in the 1988 revolt, but “since the end of the war, 
the Union has been decisively compromised by the replacement of the leadership with 
regime-friendly apparatchiks” and did not take any action in the recent protests (J. 
Brown).  
With concern to opposition groups, there are a couple of other secularist parties 
that are allowed to be included in Algeria’s parliament, such as Front of Socialist Forces 
(FFS) and Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD). “Given the ongoing role of security 
services behind the scenes of the political arena and the rigged nature of a party system 
that contains within it no real, active political opposition, it is not surprising that 
Algerians are increasingly indifferent to parties and politics in general (Zoubir 190). 
Thus, most of the recent Arab Spring protests in Algeria were unorganized, except for a 
couple of protests arranged by specific groups, such as, Rally for Culture and Democracy 
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(RCD), Algerian League for Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), Coordination for 
Change and Democracy (CNCD), Zionist groups, and an umbrella group consisting of 
human rights leaders, lawyers, and unionists. The population understands the limited 
mobility of political parties to create reforms and bring about real change, especially 
oppositional ones (Zoubir 182). Even so, “President Bouteflika recognized the threat such 
momentum [from opposition groups] could pose to his regime (S. Brown 15).  
Protests in Algeria 
 
Algeria experienced its first protest after the start of the Arab Spring on December 
23, 2010, shortly after the Tunisian uprising. As opposed to Jordan, Algeria’s first protest 
turned violent after a week. The protest occurred in Algeria’s capital in the Les Palmiers 
neighborhood over insufficient housing. A total of fifty-three people were injured, but 
fifty-two of them were a part of the security forces, while only one was a civilian. The 
protesters were unhappy with the fact that the government threatened to take away their 
housing in parts of Les Palmiers and relocate them to newer houses in a different area 
(“Scores Hurts”). 
The Algerian government created the new housing plan in 1984, but the protests 
began as the Tunisian uprising inspired demonstrators and the government started to 
revive the project. The protesters demanded to be a part of the beneficiaries list. “Chronic 
housing shortages are a serious issue in the capital, with many young people forced to 
stay with their parents well into adulthood” (“Scores Hurt”). The demonstrations even 
extended into surrounding neighborhoods, such as Ennakhil, Laaquiba, Diar el Babor and 
Cervantes, where residents were also upset with the inadequate housing. Many protesters 
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attacked police officers with Molotov cocktails and stones, leading up to the clash 
(“Scores Hurt”) 
 Protests started up again in Algeria on January 3, 2011 and lasted until January 
10, 2011. Rather than inadequate housing, the protests were sparked by the rise in price 
of food staples. Included are milk and sugar, which are basic essential foods for 
Algerians. The protesters were reported to be mainly young males, but they created a lot 
of violence. “They are burning tires, breaking into buildings, breaking everything....We 
can hear the screams,” said journalist Lania Tagzout (“Protests Intensifying”). The rise in 
price of food staples sparked the weeklong protests, but the civilians were also unhappy 
with the ongoing issue with housing and the high rate of unemployment. All of these 
issues have been brewing over time in Algeria, but once again, the uprising in Tunisia 
triggered the protests. A particular group or leader did not organize the demonstrations, 
therefore forming chaos, such as many injuries among security forces and the protesters. 
The police were not liable for many of the injuries, but they did use tear gas to break up 
the protests. Even with the number of injuries, the dissidents explained, "everyone 
understands that things will only change through violence” (“Protest Intensifying”).  
 The weeklong protests in the beginning of January 2011 heightened after Friday 
prayers on January 7
th
. Algerian security forces armed themselves with tear gas and 
weapons outside of mosques in the capital, but protesters still attacked the police forces 
with stones and hard objects. The first death occurred outside the capital in Msila, as a 
result of the clash. “The official APS news agency said protesters ransacked government 
buildings, bank branches and post offices in ‘several eastern cities’ overnight, including 
Constantine, Jijel, Setif and Bouira” (Chikhi). The protesters made their way over to 
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schools and gas utility buildings run by the state. Even so, analysts predicted that the 
uprisings would not turn into similar actions in the 1990s that created a ten-year civil war. 
The demonstrators continued to complain about high unemployment rates, which were 
noted to be between ten and twenty-five percent, and food prices that doubled in 2010. 
Overall, “the riots, more intense than the periodic outbreaks of unrest the country of 35 
million has grown accustomed to, put authorities under pressure to deliver economic 
results that reflect strengthening state revenues from energy exports” (Chikhi). More than 
just minor grievances, the protesters expressed their need for major change that 
encompassed values of freedom and development (Chikhi).  
 The following day, on January 8, 2011, two people were murdered as a result of 
the riots over food prices and high rates of unemployment. The two deaths occurred in 
Tipaza province and Msila province. Some reports claimed that the killings were linked 
to police shootings, but official reports never confirmed the assault. Along with the 
killings, over 400 people were injured. Even the Algerian Football Federation postponed 
league matches that could have sparked protests. “The riots are widely seen as drawing 
on deep frustrations with the ruling elite and a lack of political freedom, as well as more 
immediate concerns about the cost of living, housing, and jobs” (“Overnight Riots”).  
The next day, on January 9, 2011, a third person was murdered in the clash, which 
triggered the Algerian government to reconsider the high food prices (“Reports”). 
Roberts claims that the private sector traders initiated the price increases, as the 
government does not have the ability to create these changes (“Reports”) Regardless, the 
private sector traders raised prices on staple goods “in reaction to the government's 
attempts to impose new regulations on their transactions. The government's decision was, 
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in principle, part of the necessary and long overdue attempt to curb the rampant informal 
sector of the economy by subjecting the trade in foodstuffs to basic regulation and to 
bring it back into the formal sector” (Roberts). Roberts claims that Algeria has faced 
many protests in the past regarding rising prices and unemployment, but the weeklong 
protests had completely changed the dynamic of demonstrations in Algeria, as it occurred 
across the country, simultaneously, and at a great speed from the beginning of January 
2011 (Roberts).  
 Roberts further explains how Algeria’s national daily newspaper, El Watan, 
reported the protests as riots that could possibly turn into ones similar to those in October 
of 1988. In October of 1988, Algeria experienced bloody and traumatic clashes, where 
Algerian troops opened fire on innocent civilians after the army commanders announced 
a State of Siege. Even so, the army had not acted at this point in time during the January 
2011 weeklong protests and instead practiced restraint. The outcome of the weeklong 
protests was unclear at the end of the week, but it ended up dying down until late 
January, with the exception of some self-immolations, as the government made a few 
announcements in regards to the rising prices to calm the crowds (Roberts).  
 Throughout mid January, a number of self-immolations took place. This was a 
way to remake the start of the Tunisian revolution when Mohamed Bouazizi lit himself 
on fire in front of a government building. On January 17, 2011, Mohsen Bouterfif, an 
Algerian citizen, set himself on fire and died in front of a government building, the 
Boukhadra town hall. “The paper reported that it happened after a meeting with the 
mayor who was unable to provide Bouterfif with a job and a house. About 100 young 
men protested over Mohsen's death in the town, in Tebessa province, 700 km east of 
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Algiers” (Algerian Dies). Earlier in the week, three other Algerians attempted to kill 
themselves as a form of protest; one did so outside the domestic intelligence agency 
headquarters. Bouterfif was the first death as a result of Algerian self-immolations in 
2011 (“Algerian Dies”).  
 On January 21, 2011, large protests started up again in the Algerian capital. The 
protests occurred as a result of a government ban on protests against the regime. The 
protests attempted to make their way to a government building in Algiers. As a result, a 
clash occurred between the protesters and the security forces. “Opposition leaders say 42 
people were injured and taken to a hospital. The state-run APS news agency says seven 
officers were injured, two seriously” (“Police”). The demonstrators waved the Algerian 
flag and the Tunisian flag to reveal their support for change, while the security forces 
commanded control with their batons (“Police”). 
  On January 29, 2011, a massive protest took place in Bejaja, a northeastern city in 
Algeria. This time 10,000 protesters showed up to a rally. “Demonstrators marched 
peacefully in the city in Algeria’s Berber-speaking Kabylie region, shouting Tunisia-
inspired slogans such as: ‘For a radical change of the regime!,’ a lawmaker with the 
opposition Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), Mohamed Ikhervane, told AFP” 
(France Presse). This was the first large protest in Algeria that was organized by a group, 
Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD). The protest did not turn out to be violent, but 
the police surrounded the city, which led to a calm dispersion of the demonstrators. Aside 
from the RCD, the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), a pro-
democracy opposition group, also declared its plans for an organized protest in the capital 
on February 12, 2011 (France Presse).  
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 On February 8, 2011, university students started an “indefinite strike”. Rather 
than grievances over unemployment and rising prices, the students protested the teaching 
quality in Algeria. Over 500 students showed up to the protest as they boycotted class in 
the capital. They demanded better education and a brand new qualification system across 
the cities of Algiers, Annaba, Tlemcen, and Oran. “Following a presidential decree of 
December 2010, the formerly used ‘master’ degree is now replaced by a ‘magisterial’ 
degree, which also would mean that an engineer education will now end up with a title 
equivalent to a ‘professional education’” (“Large Student”). This change angered the 
students because it completely disregarded any previous dedications to a specific degree. 
In addition to these issues, the students were unhappy with the poor studying conditions 
and the lack of job availability (“Large Student”).  
 The dynamic of the Algerian protests completely changed on February 12, 2011, 
the day after Hosni Mubarak resigned as Egypt’s autocratic leader. In Algiers, “heavily 
outnumbered by riot police, thousands of Algerians defied government warnings and 
dodged barricades to rally in their capital Saturday, demanding democratic reforms” 
(“400 Arrested”). An umbrella group, mainly joined by human rights leaders, lawyers, 
unionists, and a number of other groups, arranged the demonstration. The main purpose 
of the protest was to demand democratic reforms rather than oust Bouteflika. The 
officials reported that only about 1,500 people made it to the rally, but over 10,000 
Algerians showed up to the protest, as they made their way over the barricades. The 
demonstrators protested against a police state and demanded an Algerian government 
“for the people” (“400 Arrested”).  
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Clashes occurred between the insurgents and the security forces, but there was no 
reported violence. The Algerian security forces arrested about 400 protesters for a short 
time period. Inspired by the successful uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the opposition 
finally spoke out about its anger with the law on public protests and the need for change 
in Algeria. Ali Rachedi, the prior leader of the Front of Socialist Forces party, explained, 
“‘this demonstration is a success because it's been 10 years that people haven't been able 
to march in Algiers and there's a sort of psychological barrier,’” as he expressed the new 
absence of fear in Algeria (“400 Arrested”).  
 Furthermore, the demonstrators were unhappy with President Bouteflika’s 
unwillingness to end the state of emergency. The state of emergency was first declared in 
the 1990s when Algeria experienced a violent Islamist insurgency. “Opponents say he 
should have long ago ended a state of emergency declared at the start of that civil strife, 
and is doing too little to use Algeria's vast oil and gas wealth to help the bulk of its 35 
million people” (“400 Arrested”). The opposition groups realized that Bouteflika retained  
 the state of emergency only as a political weapon to restrict all protests. Bouteflika 
claimed that he would soon lift the state of emergency, but the group of protesters still 
went through with the rally on February 12, 2011, which ended up being a congregation 
at the First of May Square in Algiers (“400 Arrested”). 
 Along with the grievances that fueled the state of emergency on February 12, 
2011, blocked Facebook and Internet pages angered the protesters. “It was the apparent 
government attack on the internet which was of particular significance to those calling for 
an end to President Abdelaziz Boutifleka's repressive regime” (Ramdani). With the prior 
uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, organized by the Internet, the Algerian government felt 
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the need to block pages that could mobilize opponents in Algeria. A number of the 
demonstrators were detained for quite some time after operating violent rallies 
(Ramdani).  
 On February 18, 2011, Algeria was placed on high alert for upcoming protests 
and rallies for democracy. The Algerian government promised the Algerian citizens that 
it would end the state of emergency, but the opposition groups called for protests every 
Saturday regardless of the announcement. “Demonstrators said people now felt less 
scared of taking to the streets. The protest organizers said the government’s offer to lift 
the state of emergency was a red herring as it could simply be replaced by an even more 
repressive anti-terrorist law” (Chrisafis).  
 On February 22, 2011, the Algerian government finally lifted the state of 
emergency. Protests died down until the beginning of March 2011. On March 2, 2011, a 
large group of protesting men marched to Algeria’s parliament. Rather than the usual 
opposition leaders and unhappy youths, “they were Communal Guards, state-armed 
militia on the front line of the country's long battle with Islamist extremists, and their 
protest served as an eloquent example of the breadth of social unrest in this gas-rich 
North African nation” (“Algeria Keeps Lid”). The grievances among the Algerians 
protesting in the first few months of 2011 finally caught up with the Communal Guards, 
as they too started to express anger towards the government. The Guards expressed their 
unwillingness to clash with the state, but “they feel humiliated by lowly government job 
offers put forward now that the service is gradually being disbanded, and emboldened by 
the protesters from all quarters of society” (“Algeria Keeps Lid”).  
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The protest among the Communal Guards came as a result of the government’s 
lifting of the state of emergency. This ban led to dispersion of the security forces, as they 
are no longer needed. They were disgruntled with their lack of income, rights, medical 
benefits, and housing. The Communal Guards believe that they should not be receiving 
lower class jobs, such as housekeepers, when they have fought against terrorism before. 
Ultimately, the force was upset about its loss of power and “the consensus is the same: 
any hope for democracy in Algeria means dismantling the military pedestal on which the 
regime sits — not removing a president” (“Algeria Keeps Lid”).  
 A few days later, on March 5, 2011, a protest took place on behalf of the National 
Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD) to demand a regime change. The 
Algerian security forces and pro-government demonstrators were able to halt the protest 
and counter the chaos. The CNCD were upset with the restriction on political protests and 
called the protest in three different cities throughout Algeria. “Counter-demonstrators 
carrying photos of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika chanted ‘Bouteflika Is Not (Hosni) 
Mubarak’ -- the Egyptian president forced out by a popular uprising on February 18. 
They chased and roughed up the anti-government protestors” (Police, Pro Government). 
The counter demonstrators were young, violent, and even threatened to lynch one of the 
members of the CNCD, who also happened to be the leader of the RCD. The CNCD was 
originally founded during the late January protests, but some of the independent trade 
unions decided to leave the party, as the CNCD did not match their interests. “The CNCD 
has said it wants the immediate end of Bouteflika's regime, citing the same problems of 
high unemployment, housing and soaring costs that inspired the uprisings in Tunisia and 
Egypt” (“Police, Pro-Government”). The CNCD took on a more radical approach to the 
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protests and called for the end to Bouteflika’s regime, rather than the policy changes most 
protesters were looking for.  
 Two days later on March 7, 2011, a second protest took place on behalf of the 
security forces in Algeria. Over 2,000 members of the forces showed up to the rally. The 
Algerian Municipal Guards gathered in Martyrs’ Square in Algiers. They were unhappy 
with their low wages, and therefore demanded raises and early retirement. These are the 
same guards that fought the Islamist militants in the early 1990s. “The government has 
considered dissolving the municipal police by redeploying its officers to other bodies 
including the army. But officers have rejected that, demanding a salary rise with 
retroactive effect as of 2008 or early retirement” (Disgruntled Police). To counter this 
protest, the Algerian government sent out the Algerian police to stabilize the 
demonstration (“Disgruntled Police”). 
 The protests died down in Algeria until March 16 and March 23. A slight clash 
occurred on March 16, 2011. A number of young males decided to throw petrol bombs 
and stones in the Diar el Mahsoul neighborhood. The police used tear gas to break up the 
riot. The protesters expressed minor problems that they wanted changed, such as their 
housing. Other than that, the young males did not have many political demands. About 
sixty of the males demanded to meet with senior politicians about their housing issues 
and tried to block a road to get their way. “‘We live like dogs. We live in one apartment 
with the whole family and we have been here since the 1960s,’ one young protester told 
Reuters” (“Update 1”). Eventually about 150 males joined in, while 300 police officers 
were deployed to cater to the scene.  
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 A week later, on March 23, 2011, a similar riot occurred in Algiers. This time five 
police officers were hurt in the riots, where the protesters threw stones and petrol bombs. 
The demonstrators were trying to halt the bulldozing operation that was meant to take 
down illegally built houses. The insurgents also decided to set a car on fire and throw 
bricks at the police officers using tear gas to break up the riot. “The clashes, in the Oued 
Koriche suburb of Algiers, began when local officials ordered the demolition of more 
than 30 houses built on publicly-owned land without a permit. Police in protective gear 
formed a shield around bulldozers which moved in to demolish the houses” (“Algerian 
Police)”. The protesters were unable to successfully stop the bulldozers and the buildings 
were destroyed (“Algerian Police”).  
 After March, the protests died in Algeria, with the exception of a few rallies and a 
couple of strikes. On June 23, 2011, a terrorist group committing a bomb attack targeted a 
military patrol. One of the soldiers died and another one was injured. As a result, 
Algerian soldiers entered the villages in Azazga, part of the Kabylie region, and shot the 
wrong civilian, who happened to be innocent. “The regional governor of Tizi Ouzou, 
Abdelkader Bouazghi, reacted angrily, saying, ‘there was a man killed, sacking, theft, 
destruction of property and violation of privacy’” (“Algerian Village”). To stand up for 
the innocent civilian, opposition groups organized a demonstration after the funeral. The 
defense ministry announced its mistake and the Maghreb and African affairs minister, 
Abdelkader Messahel, blamed the attack on terrorist groups, mainly radical Islamists that 
armed themselves with weapons from Libya (“Algerian Village”) 
 A few months later, on September 16 and 17 of 2011, Algerian citizens called for 
nationwide protests against the president’s regime and the Algerian army. In response, 
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the Algerian security forces and the interior ministry were placed on high alert. Reports 
clamed that ‘Zionist’ groups organized the protest on Facebook and targeted the young 
Algerian citizens to incite them. Ould Kablia, the Algerian interior minister said, “‘had it 
been people inside [the country], we would have exposed and arrested them, but the clues 
point us toward foreign parties in relation with the Zionist entity,’” and the “initial 
investigation showed that there was a lack of popular support for the protest call” 
(“Algerian Authorities”). The Facebook page only attracted 1,500 members, but had the 
goal of a revolution on September 17, 2011 for a “‘free state with free people’” 
(“Algerian Authorities”). Kabila explained how the Facebook protest was meant to 
disturb national order in Algeria, but it failed to successfully mobilize the Algerian 
citizens (“Algerian Authorities”).  
 A month later, on October 9, 2011, a rally took place in Algiers over the lack of 
jobs. The CNCD, unemployment rights activist group, organized the protest. “The group 
had called the rally to demand more jobs, improved unemployment benefits and the right 
to demonstrate freely,” but the Algerian police arrested about twenty-five members 
(“Algerian Arrest”). The Algerian security forces felt obligated to arrest some of the 
protesters, as they planned on mimicking the violent protests of 1988 for democracy. 
Overall, the protest was contained and did not turn into a large movement (“Algerian 
Arrest”).  
 In 2012, opposition groups failed to organize successful protests for the most part. 
In February of 2012, the main opposition groups based on Islam announced its decision 
to run as allies in the May 2012 parliamentary elections. “The alliance of three of the 
country’s fractious Islamist parties increases the likelihood of Algeria following in the 
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steps of three other North African countries where Islamists have recently triumphed at 
the ballot box” (Ouali). The parties had the goal of forming an Arab Spring, similar to the 
successful ones in Tunisia and Egypt. With this in mind, the parties also requested the 
alliance of other parties with similar interests. The parties expressed their optimism for 
success, as elections in Tunisia and Egypt ended with Islamist-dominated parliaments. 
Algeria’s government did not view this as a threat, as Algerians normally fear religious 
parties ever since the 1992 military coup and bloody civil war prompted by the Islamist 
militants (Ouali).  
 Leading up to Algerian elections in May 2012, a number of sporadic attempted 
protests occurred in Algiers. Algerian authorities took action through tactics, such as 
detainment, to prevent citizens from protesting peacefully against the government. 
Algerian security forces even arrested one of the candidates for the Algerian elections. 
The security forces also fended off suspected demonstrators from heading to the capital 
(Algeria: Crackdown). Aside from the protest attempts, Algeria’s population simmered 
down, even after the election. “Barely a week after a vote derided by much of the 
population as a sham, there are no protests in the streets of this capital city. In a volatile 
region, there are no marches, no rallies and no demonstrations” (Nossiter).  
Nossiter explains that sixty to eighty percent of the population boycotted the vote, 
as they knew the military-backed regime would claim victory over the Islamist opposition 
candidates, but they did not even organize a demonstration (Nossiter). With the exception 
of a minor protest, where an Internet blogger called for a mass violent protest against the 
elections, many Algerians did not voice their opinions against the Algerian elections 
(Honda). Ultimately, “the police [were] everywhere, and though criticism flow[ed] freely 
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in the street, it [was] sometimes delivered anonymously, and with a glance over the 
shoulder” (Nossiter).  
Aside from the anti-government protests, Algerian citizens made a few calls for 
protests in regards to a small American Youtube film. The film was considered 
disrespectful to Islam’s Prophet Muhammad. The anger was geared towards Americans 
and even turned into an attack on the American embassy in Libya. “The Algiers embassy 
said unspecified groups were using online social networks to organize demonstrations ‘to 
protest a range of issues’” (Craggs). The demonstration did not end up moving to Algeria, 
but the U.S Embassy warned Americans to stay clear of official buildings and crowded 
places in Algeria, especially after the Gaddafi family fled to Algiers (Craggs).  
In 2013, a couple of anti-government protests occurred sporadically in Algiers 
and provinces close to the capital. Similar to the original protests in 2011, violent 
demonstrations occurred in Algiers on behalf of the youth population in regards to rising 
food prices and unemployment. The protesters also condemned declining government 
services. The protests turned violent when the insurgents started throwing stones at the 
police forces. In the Bab el-Oued neighborhood, the rioters made their way to police 
headquarters and stormed the building, which led Algerian authorities to place security 
forces on high alert. Similar protests occurred in Zeralda, Esharaqa, Tibaza, and Oran. 
Aijbali reported, “government-owned TV channels completely ignored the protests in 
their news casts at night on Wednesday and instead reported on the progress of 
government housing and infrastructure projects across the country” (Aijbaili). Most 
recently protests have died down due to the focus on the hostage crisis, where a number 
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of foreigners were taken hostage by Al Qaeda terrorists in an Algeria’s gas plant 
(Ahmed).  
Algeria’s Response 
In response to the protests in Algeria over the past few years, Algeria’s 
government has made a number of minor changes to appease the protesters. The earliest 
announcements and changes were made in the first week of January of 2011. At first, the 
government made a few comments concerning the rising prices. Government officials 
claimed that the price increases would be cancelled. To deal with the surface problem, the 
Algerian government also looked to religious leaders to calm down the rioters. Lastly, a 
number of senior regime leaders took it upon themselves to request that the protesters 
“demonstrate peacefully” (Roberts).  
President Bouteflika also stated that the state of emergency was soon to be lifted. 
He never set a date, but this was a major announcement, as the state of emergency had 
been in place since the early 1990s. Along with the state of emergency, the government 
vowed to lower taxes and increase the number of wheat supplies to stores (“Middle 
East”). Mainly, the Algerian regime promised to reduce taxes and “import duties on some 
staple goods” (Algeria Vows). Their goal was to ultimately cut down on the price of basic 
foods, such as sugar and oil, by forty-one percent. Lastly, the government responded with 
harsh actions by committing to punish any rioters, especially those that became violent. 
The interior minister, Dahou Ould Kabila, said “around 1,000 protestors had been 
arrested, many of them minors, during the weekend disturbances, adding that they 
would appear before judges” (“Algeria Vows”).   
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 On February 3, 2011, Bouteflika made another announcement with regards to the 
state of emergency. He claimed that he would soon lift the rule, but there would still be 
restrictions on protests in Algiers. Also, Bouteflika announced that Algerians would even 
have better access to media sources, such as television and radio. The state controls the 
Algerian television and radio programs and barely broadcasts opposing views, but 
Bouteflika declared his willingness to allow political parties on the air. Finally, 
Bouteflika addressed the issue of unemployment and urged the government to adopt new 
initiatives to create jobs in Algeria (Lowe and Chikhi).  
The government always had a fear of Islamist insurgents since the last civil war in 
Algeria, but it understood that concessions needed to be made in order to ensure a lasting 
regime without protests. Lowe and Chikhi claimed, “nevertheless, the announcement by 
Bouteflika reflects the ability -- proven many times before -- of Algeria's ruling elite to 
adapt to changing circumstances and do what is necessary to stay in power” (Lowe and 
Chikhi). Bouteflika did not want the Arab Spring to reach Algeria the way it did in 
Tunisia, and therefore attempted to make some minor compromises for the Algerian 
citizens. 
On February 14, 2011, the Algerian government announced its plans to officially 
remove the state of emergency rule. This came right after Algeria experienced weeklong 
protests around Algeria demanding government reform and a change to leadership. The 
Foreign Minister of Algeria, Mourad Medelci, claimed, “‘soon, we will discuss the past, 
but I say that lifting the state of emergency will occur in the coming days,’” and “it will 
mean a ‘return to Algeria, a rightful state which totally allows, the expression of 
opinions, but always with reference to the law’” (“Algeria To Lift”). The president did 
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not release the exact date he would lift the ban, but he promised that he would take these 
actions in the upcoming days (“Algeria To Lift”). 
A few days later, on February 22, 2011, Algeria’s cabinet voted to lift the state of 
emergency rule. In response to the massive protests across Algeria, the government 
feared an uprising, similar to the ones that took down authoritarian leadership in Tunisia 
and Egypt. The state of emergency rule was a common grievance among the Algerian 
protesters. Alongside lifting the state of emergency, the government created a package of 
initiatives to decrease unemployment in Algeria, which was also a major complaint 
among demonstrators (“Algeria To End”). Bouteflika also allowed court trials for 
“assigned residence” detainees and sent a number of the prisoners to official detention 
facilities. These were significant concessions for Algerians because it provided fair trials 
and legal facilities for some detainees (“World Report 2012”). Even so, Algerian citizens 
were complaining about the government’s failure to make sufficient reforms. For 
example, Mustafa Bouchachi, Algerian Human Rights League chairman, said, “‘we need 
a real opening up for political, media and social activities so that the people can 
experience democracy for themselves”’ (“Algeria To End”) Also, even though the 
emergency rule was lifted, new laws were adopted to allow the military involvement in 
domestic security. Not to mention, the government explained how the protesters were still 
banned from holding demonstration marches in Algiers (“Algeria To End”).  
Along with the lift on the state of emergency, the government approved plans to 
combat unemployment in Algeria. The first part of the package included a 100 billion 
Algerian dinars specified for public banks for the purpose of long-term business 
investments. The second part of the package consisted of measurements to encourage 
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employment through the reduction of business social security handouts. Lastly, the 
Algerian government agreed on “promoting the farming sector, one of the country's 
biggest employers, by offering low-interest loans to farmers and making it easier for 
domestic companies to lease farmland” (“Algeria To End”). The Algerian government 
claimed unemployment was at about ten percent, but these measures would reduce the 
rate (“Algeria To End”).  
On April 14, 2011, Bouteflika announced he would make a number of changes, 
such as constitutional amendments and laws concerning elections, the media, and 
political parties (“Algeria: Crackdown”). This was Bouteflika’s initiative to ensure a 
representative democracy (Chikhi). He claimed that he would do it through a 
constitutional commission (“Arab Uprising”). Bouteflika also touched upon his promises 
for free elections, as well as his willingness to halt the detainment of journalists. “In a 30 
minute speech, Bouteflika announced he would change the electoral law in Algeria, 
which is due to hold the next presidential election in 2014” and he said “‘all measures 
will be taken to ensure free and fair elections including supervision by international 
observers’” (Chikhi). Algeria’s president promised he would enact a new information 
law, as Algerians were upset with the existing law that enables authorities to jail 
journalists writing about their opposition to Bouteflika and fine them up to 250,000 
dinars (Chikhi).  
In July of 2011, the Algerian government made a few more concessions. This 
time, the Algerian parliament agreed to remove prison terms with the revision of two 
parts in the press code. These prison terms regard those that are sentenced for slandering 
the president or any state institutions. This did not include prison fines. Later in 
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September of 2011, a draft press code was approved by the Council of Ministers. This 
was a big step for the government because prison sentences for verbal offences would be 
eliminated if the code were adopted (“World Report 2012”).  
Aside from some of the concessions the Algerian government has made, Algerian 
authorities have employed many additional tactics to quell the protests. For example, in 
May of 2012, leading up to the elections, Algerian security forces arrested and detained 
many of the demonstrators in Algiers. The security forces also deployed during the week 
of elections to prevent possible demonstrators from entering the capital. “Security forces 
in the capital have taken pre-emptive measures and used force against groups who have 
tried to defy the ban on demonstrations in the capital, especially when the purpose of the 
demonstration was considered politically sensitive” (“Algeria: Crackdown”). The 
security forces tried blocking anyone from entering the areas of planned protests. Once 
protesters made their way into the site, the Algerian forces dispersed the demonstrators 
and arrested them. A number of the protesters were then held in police stations for many 
hours (“Algeria: Crackdown”). 
Algeria also made the effort to establish the appearance of free and fair elections 
during May of 2012. According to news sources, Algeria’s parliamentary elections in 
May of 2012, where the National Liberation Front (FLN) won, were considered its most 
legitimate elections in years. “A wide range of candidates took part after the president 
approved the establishment of 23 new political parties” (“Arab Uprising”). Even Hilary 
Clinton applauded the election as a path towards reform in allowing Algerians to express 
their opinion. Even though many Algerians boycotted the elections, the announcements 
helped stabilize the regime and portray the elections as legitimate. The Algerian 
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government also took substantial steps to establish free and fair elections. For example, 
the Algerian government allowed the EU observers to monitor the polls for transparency 
(Lowe). The Algerian government has also since made efforts to appease the Algerian 
citizens with a public spending program funded by its oil and gas exports. This was an 
effort to fix social and economic problems that have led to many protests in Algeria 
(“Arab Uprising”).  
Theories 
 Similar to Jordan, theorists have debated the reasons as to why Algeria’s regime 
continues to endure, even after the Arab Spring. Algeria has also faced a number of 
protests over the post couple of years but the regime still stands to this day. Most of the 
debated arguments about Algeria’s endurance fall under the topic of historical, military, 
economic, political, demographic, and geographic reasons.  
In regards to historical reasons, one of the most widely argued theories among 
scholars as to why Algeria’s regime still exists today is its historical legitimacy that has 
created unity among the country. The French first colonized Algeria in 1830. This led to 
eight years of war between Algerian citizens and the French, as they were desperate for 
independence. The National Liberation Front led the fight against the French and brutal 
fighting took place, resulting in a large number of deaths. Algeria finally received 
independence in 1962, but “the physical costs of the war were immense with a death toll 
in the hundreds of thousands, 3 million Algerians displaced, and villages and 
infrastructure destroyed.  To make matters worse, with the enemy defeated, a power 
struggle then commenced between the disparate leaders of the revolution” (Barr 52). This 
led to purgings of French residents and Algerians supportive of the French, upwards of 
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one million, which resulted in mass bloodshed. Once the Algerians finally received 
independence, Ahmed Ben Bella, a revolutionary leader, was elected as president until he 
was ousted in a coup. A couple of FLN leaders took power and Houari Boumediene, 
former Minister of Defense Colonel, led the Algerian government as a revolutionary 
(Barr 52).  
Unfortunately, the fighting did not stop once Boumediene transitioned as leader of 
the Algerian government. “Boumediene took a pragmatic approach, making Islamic and 
Arab identity pillars of a unified Algerian state, but at the same time maintained firm 
state control over its practice” (Barr 53). Boumediene died shortly after taking power as 
president, but Colonel Chadli Bendjedid replaced Boumediene. Bendjedid was unable to 
satisfy the Algerian population, as his policies led to economic deterioration. Brutal riots 
started to occur in 1988, which led to inclusive politics. A number of opposition parties 
started to emerge, such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The FIS quickly gained 
popularity and became a notable political party to Algerians. “When FIS undisputedly 
took the lead in national elections, the army annulled the results and commenced a 
crackdown on the Islamists. Driven underground, the Islamists were subject to mass 
arrests, torture, disappearances, and deportation to the Sahara” (Barr 53).  
These brutal measures led the Islamists to respond with terrorist attacks targeting 
innocent civilians and Algerian intellectuals. Many initiatives failed to solve this conflict 
and brutal fighting lasted until the 1990s. Over 100,000 people were killed. The 
government finally took control and the violence ended once the armed wing of the FIS 
was disbanded in January of 2000. Ultimately, through these historical events, the 
government has been viewed as the legitimate protector of Algeria against threatening 
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groups, such as the Islamist groups. The government has been able to instill unity among 
Algerians and portray itself as a legitimate leader (Barr 54). 
Lastly, in relation to historical events, Algerians are still traumatized by the 
violence and bloodshed during the 1988 riots and past wars. “The ramifications of this 
violence are still felt today, moreover, as over 7,000 ‘disappeared’ Algerians remain 
unaccounted for.  The fear that another popular revolution could result in similar 
destruction is a very legitimate aspect of the Algerian psychology” (Barr 56). Therefore, 
Algerians are unwilling to involve themselves in another uprising that could possibly lead 
to more violence. 
With regards to military reasons, scholars argue that the power of Algeria’s 
security forces allow the regime to endure. Barr explains how the pouvoir militaire used 
their coercive forces to the fullest with the army, security forces, and secret police during 
the recent protests. “With the overwhelming force on the side of the ruling elites, 
protesters knew that all that stood between them and the butt of a gun was the internal 
cost benefit analysis of the ruling elites that determine whether it’s worth it” (Barr 62). 
The Algerian citizens were even nervous about a possible crackdown by the military. 
Although the military did not take this route, they banned and blocked protests with great 
strength. A number of protests still occurred, but the security forces were able to 
outnumber the insurgents many times. They even dispersed and beat protesters that made 
their way beyond the barricades (Barr 62). Many times citizens are afraid of voicing their 
concerns because the police are ordered to spread out and hold down every area 
(Nossiter). When the demonstrators became violent, the police used tear gas (Barr 62). 
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Ultimately, Barr argues that the Algerian military portrayed its significant strength during 
the protests that helped the regime to endure.  
To further strengthen Barr’s argument, Achy explains that not only is the Algerian 
military extremely powerful, but it is also loyal to the government. “Officers are both 
well-paid--they earn 65 percent more than average public civil servant (U.S. $470 
compared to U.S. $280 per month)--and enjoy good career prospects, making it unlikely 
they would turn against the government” (Achy). The number of security forces has even 
increased immensely over the years. There are about 170 police officers today in Algeria, 
while there were only about 50,000 officers in the 1990s. Algerian police officers have 
not open fired on protesters, but they are certainly loyal to the Algerian government. 
Aside from the military’s numbers, strength, and loyalty, it is more integrated into 
Algeria’s politics compared to Egypt and Tunisia. Therefore, protesters would be unable 
to change the regime, even if they ousted the president. “In addition, many general 
officers manage the largest public-sector companies, giving them privileged access to 
strategic sectors in the economy” (Achy). Overall, the Algerian military has exceptional 
power that will allow the regime to endure. 
Aside from the arguments regarding historical legitimacy and the military, many 
theorists argue economic reasons for Algeria’s endurance. Some scholars point to the 
idea of resource wealth. Algeria’s resource wealth mainly comes from its oil reserves. 
“With its reserves of natural gas ranked 8th in the world and oil reserves at 16th, Algeria 
has been able to keep debt to about 1% of GDP, amass large amounts of foreign currency, 
and maintain a significant hydrocarbon stabilization fund” (Barr 54). Oil and natural gas 
encompass about thirty percent of Algeria’s GDP, which essentially makes up Algeria’s 
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economy. The Algerian government mainly spends this wealth on regime elites and 
groups that keep the population in line, such as the military pouvoir. The Algerian 
government even owns SONATRACH, a company dealing with hydrocarbon industries, 
ranked number nine as the largest company in the world. This company completely 
drives Algeria’s economy and wealth. “SONATRACH is the regime’s “most lucrative 
source of patronage, privilege, and power,” making it integral to Algeria’s endurance 
(Barr 54).  
Algeria’s resource wealth came in especially handy during the protests, as the 
government bought off some of the demonstrators. Bauer and Schiller explain how 
Algeria hands out economic benefits, similar to the way Saudi Arabia does, to alleviate 
all political demands (Bauer and Schiller 1). “Some analysts say that Algeria is different 
from Egypt and Tunisia because its huge revenues from energy exports allow it to satisfy 
many of its citizens' economic grievances, especially at a time when oil prices are around 
$100 a barrel” (“Algeria Promises”). Achy argues that this was the best possible way to 
handle the protests before they led to violence and brutal fighting. The resource wealth 
was also allocated for food subsidies, raises for court clerks and municipal civil servants, 
and interest-free loans for young entrepreneurs to start up their businesses. The young 
entrepreneurs were also given tax exemptions for three-years, and “[reserved] a quota of 
local public contracts for them” (Achy).  
The government is also fairly generous about its youth-loan employment agency, 
which has reduced tension among youths looking for money. For example, Souad 
Gharabi, a young lawyer in Algiers, received a 7,000-dollar loan for her rent. “‘People 
see there is the $200 billion,” said Hammouda Naccredine, another economist at the 
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university, referring to Algeria’s cash reserves. ‘And they say, ‘How do I get it?’” 
(Nossiter) Nossiter further reveals that Algeria holds 180 billion dollars in cash reserves 
that are oil generated. These reserves and a government money program for oppositional 
youth allow them to mitigate reform calls (Nossiter).  
Aside from handouts to buy off the opposition, the government made economic 
concessions. The government subsidized necessary goods, such as flour or butane gas 
(Bauer and Schiller 2). Not to mention Bouteflika responded to some of the protests with 
price cuts, mainly on some staple goods. “In addition, in a speech, Bouteflika made vague 
promises of future political and economic reforms to tackle unemployment and other 
economic disparities and exempted men 30 and older from mandatory military duty if 
they have not already served” (Barr 63). Bouteflika also announced his plan to transfer 
cash and furniture to impoverished families (Achy). These economic concessions were 
able to meet the demands of many oppositional protesters and alleviate grievances that 
were driving the unrest (Barr 63).  
Scholars also argue political reasons for Algeria’s lasting regime. International 
support is among these theories. Bouteflika was able to strengthen Algeria’s foreign 
relations after he was elected in 1999. He opened up relations with the Middle East, 
North Africa, and parts of the West (Barr 54). Algeria has exceptional relationships with 
regional and international groups, as a contributing member of the Arab League and the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU). Algeria also served as a non-permanent member 
of the UN Security Council in 2004 and 2005. These supporters allow Algeria to express 
itself as an authoritative regional power. The main foreign supporter for Algeria’s regime 
has been Western alliances focusing on counter-terrorism. The terrorist group, Al-Qaeda 
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has consistently targeted Algeria with suicide attacks, bombings, and kidnappings. Even 
the UN headquarters in Algiers was bombed by Al-Qaeda in December of 2007. “Since 
they mostly target the government and foreigners, it has created a common cause between 
the West and the Algerian government and has resulted in a robust campaign of joint 
counterterrorism initiatives” (Barr 55). Algeria has been able to team up with Western 
alliances and gain international support from them through its common cause of counter-
terrorism.  
On top of international support, Achy argues how internal disagreements have led 
to a lack of protests and the endurance of Algeria’s regime. This is mainly in concern to 
demonstrations. Opposition parties and youth groups attempted to create an ad-hoc 
partnership, the National Coordination for Democratic Change (CNCD), as a way to 
peacefully protest weekly together for reforms, but they turned out to be unsuccessful as 
the groups formed many disagreements among their interests. “Internal disagreements 
within the CNCD have already emerged between human rights organizations and trade 
unions on the one hand, and political parties on the other. The bone of contention is on 
maintaining demonstrations every Saturday in Algiers despite their ban by the regime” 
(Achy).  
In addition to international support and internal disagreements, many theorists 
believe the government restrictions on opposition groups is a valid political argument. 
Algeria operates as a multi-party system, but Bouteflika’s party, the National Liberation 
Front FLN), commanded control over Algeria. The only other main parties under the 
multi-party system consist of the “‘Presidential Alliance,’” such as the National Rally for 
Democracy Party, which is run by the prime minister who abides by the president and 
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oppositional parties. A number of the opposition parties do not even have the ability to 
campaign, as the government denies them equal opportunities. These opposition parties 
include the Workers’ Party and Party for Justice and Liberty. Aside from this issue, 
Bouteflika has a complete monopoly on media sources to express himself as the only 
reasonable candidate. “As a result, while members of the political parties may have been 
in favor of political change, their ability to institute their demands through formal 
procedures was quite limited” (Barr 59). The main opposition party did not even hold its 
first formal protest until after months of demonstrations (Barr 59).  
A number of oppositional groups still exist outside the formal sector, such as ones 
in the business populace and civil society, but some theorists believe that these groups are 
not unified enough to create a successful uprising. This is partially in regards to the 
cleavages of Algerians’ ethnicities, but mainly because of disagreements amongst parties 
in concern to the notion of religion in government (Barr 59-60). “In fact, some 60 groups 
who would support democracy nonetheless prefer to accept restricted political rights in 
order to prevent an Islamist takeover or chaos” (Barr 60). Once again, this is due to 
Algerians’ fear of another brutal civil war, as the last one resulted in the deaths of 
between a 100,000 and a hundred and 20,000 Algerians and therefore their desire for 
change is limited (Achy). Nossiter explains, “tales of mutilated corpses and mass graves 
remain common currency,” and thus they are not looking for another Islamist led bloody 
repression (Nossiter). Alongside Nossiter, Byrne explains that Algerians are unwilling 
and unable to stand up for democracy if it means another violent war, as they are still 
scarred by the past (Byrne).  
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 As a result of disagreements over religion infused in the government, the 
majority of the Algerian demonstrations have even compartmentalized into minor issues 
that only represent the party organizing the protest (Barr 60). For example, each group 
separately demonstrated in concern to a different interest, such as graduate students for 
university reform and municipal civil servants for their own economic and social values. 
The lack of common grievance resulted in unsuccessful protests that only mobilized 
about 2,000 protesters for national calls (Achy). The protests started to lose steam when 
the divided groups were unable to agree on a common cause and how to go about the 
demonstrations (Barr 61). 
The recent concessions made by Bouteflika also serve as major political reasons 
among scholars for the endurance of Algeria’s regime. Aside from the price cuts of staple 
goods and promises of reforms, Bouteflika’s lifting of the state of emergency rule quelled 
some of the protests (Barr 63). Achy explains how the state of emergency lift was a major 
change for the Algerians because it existed for nineteen years (Achy). Also, the lift was a 
concession made by the government to prevent future protests (Lowe and Chikhi). 
Furthermore, Bouteflika claimed that he would make changes to the constitution and 
various electoral laws. He explained how these reforms would strengthen the multi-party 
system (Barr 63). Lastly, Byrne argues that the recent concession of a new press law has 
also helped the Algerian regime endure. The new law prohibits journalists from being 
jailed if they “stray over certain red line sin their commentary on the state of the nation” 
(Byrne). Many Algerians “believe it’s a step in the right direction and are more inclined 
to wait and see, or put pressure on the regime in other ways” (Barr 63).  
                                                                                                                                       Berger 93 
Furthermore, the geography and demographics of Algeria explain the endurance 
of the country’s regime. Similar to Achy’s argument about internal disagreements, 
because of its geography, Algeria’s citizens are unable to connect as well as those in 
Tunisia because of two mountain ranges that divide its terrain. With regard to 
demographics, there is a major cleavage in Algeria’s society, as many Algerians define 
themselves as Arab and fifteen percent of the population identify themselves as Berber. 
“This tension in recent years has centered on the predominantly Berber region of Kabylie 
where activists have consistently demanded official recognition of their language, 
Tamazight, compensation for the deaths of protesters, more economic development, and 
greater regional autonomy” (Barr 56). Tamazight was acknowledged as the official 
national language in 2001, but the issue still remains controversial between the two 
groups. Therefore, Algeria’s society is unable to connect with one another successfully to 
perform an effective uprising through a common cause (Barr 56). 
Throughout the Arab Spring, Algeria’s regime has been able to survive, even 
under various protests and rallies. Due to economic and political reasons, as well as being 
inspired by the Arab Spring, Algeria’s citizens have demonstrated against the government 
since December of 2010. With the use of various government tactics, such as 
concessions, reforms, announcements, military strength, and historical legitimacy, 
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Conclusion 
 
 Jordan’s monarchy and Algeria’s republic are two different Arab authoritarian 
regimes, but they both connect in many ways in regards to the post Arab spring protests, 
government responses, and theories among scholars as to why each regime has endured. 
Jordan and Algeria’s regimes encompass many factors that allow various other Arab 
authoritarian regimes to last. Overall, similar to many other Arab authoritarian regimes, 
Jordan and Algeria have endured for many years and continue to do so.  
The Protests 
 
The various protests that occurred over the past few years in Jordan and Algeria 
pointed to a number of similarities with regards to the causes and demands. Most of these 
common causes fall under the areas of economic reasons, living standards, corruption, 
and the lack of general ideals. As for economic causes, rising prices were huge factors in 
both Jordan and Algeria. These concerns arose multiple times amongst the anti-
government protesters, especially in the first protests post Arab Spring. Jordan’s 
protesters were more concerned with the rise in fuel prices, while Algeria’s protesters 
were angered by the rise in food staples. Along with rising prices, citizens under each 
regime protested the lack of jobs, unemployment, and general economic conditions. 
These issues had been concerns amongst Jordanians and Algerians for quite some time, 
but the Arab Spring inspired them to protest about it.  
Aside from economic causes, living standards were popular arguments with 
protesters under each regime. Living standards were concerns amongst tribesmen in 
Jordan, but the issue pertained more to Algerian citizens. A number of demonstrations 
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were organized in reference to housing issues in Algeria over the past few years, 
including one of the first protests inspired by the Tunisian protest. Algerians were upset 
with the government’s threat to relocate neighborhoods, bulldoze illegal houses, and 
general housing shortages that has consequently forced young adults to live with their 
parents. In addition, Jordanians and Algerians have formed demonstrations in response to 
government corruption. The problem with government corruption was brought up in 
Jordan more so than Algeria, but was a common cause nonetheless.  
Jordanians and Algerians have similar concerns with regards to general ideals. 
Citizens under each regime strive for freedom, democracy, and development. Protesters 
have brought up these concerns many times in demonstrations, even if they were not 
organized for those particular reasons. Overall, protesters in Jordan and Algeria called for 
reforms, rather than an end to the monarchy. A few radical protests in each country called 
for an end to the monarchy and ousting the leaders, but the majority of the 
demonstrations were linked to demands for general reforms.  
Jordanian protesters had a number of common causes for demonstrations with 
Algerians, but there were also a number of concerns did not overlap. The grievances 
specific to Jordan include economic and political reasons. One of the economic reasons 
falls under the concern of job creation. Similar to Jordanians, Algerians complained about 
unemployment rates, but Jordanian citizens also formed a couple of protests calling for 
job creation specifically for tribesmen. This is a not a huge difference, however it can still 
be noted as distinct concern separate from Algeria. Aside from the demand of jobs for 
tribesmen inflation was another reason for protests in Jordan.  
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Under political reasons, many Jordanians demanded the resignation of the prime 
minister and the dissolution of parliament altogether. This was a high concern amongst 
Jordanian protests and came up in the majority of the protests. Demonstrators called for 
the Prime Minster to resign after a new one was appointed by King Abdullah II. This led 
to another grievance with the Jordanian protesters, the king’s constant willingness to 
reshuffle the government around. A number of Jordanians caught on to King Abdullah 
II’s political strategy of reshuffling parliament to quell the demonstrations and riots. This 
is similar to a number of protests that were organized as a result of their discontent with 
minor political reforms that were cosmetic rather than substantial. Furthermore, the issues 
of prime ministers and changing parliaments have led protesters to demand an elected 
government and more political say. Jordanian started calling for the prime minister to be 
elected by the parliament rather than King Abdullah II.  
In addition to government issues, demands for constitutional change and 
democratic laws have been common among Jordanian protests. These reflect the similar 
common causes between Jordanian and Algerians, as they both expressed their interests 
in democracy and freedom. Lastly, a couple of protests occurred with regards to the 
United States’ inconsistent policy and Israel’s mission. These protests did not occur many 
times, but they were distinct to Jordan nonetheless.  
Similar to Jordan, Algeria faced a number of protests that did not overlap with 
causes in Jordan. These protests fall under economic, political, and educational 
categories. With regards to the economic causes, Algerians organized a couple of 
demonstrations with concern to specific economic issues. These included the lack of 
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Algerian unemployment benefits and medical benefits, and low income for Communal 
Guards, and the low wages for the Algerian Municipal Guards.  
Under political reasons, Algerians protested in a specific manner that mimicked 
incidents in Tunisia. A number of Algerians performed self-immolations to get the 
attention of the government. A number of these self-immolations occurred in response to 
the lack of political reforms in Algeria. In addition, Algerians were angered by the 
government ban on protests and the unwillingness of Bouteflika to lift the nineteen-year-
old state of emergency rule. This is similar to a number of demonstrations that expressed 
their concern for the restrictions on political protests. Under the educational category, 
Algeria faced a protest by university students demanding better teaching quality. The 
students protested for better education and an end to the qualification system. The 
educational concerns only came up once in the protests, but created a distinction between 
the demonstrations in Jordan and Algeria.  
Jordan’s protests were by far more organized than Algeria’s protests. The Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front organized most of Jordan’s protests, while a 
specific group or party did not organize a number of Algeria’s protests at all. Alongside 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front, leftists groups, Baathist parties, 
the “March 24th Movement,” tribal youth activists, the Constitutional Monarchy 
Movement, and the National Reform Front took charge of organizing protests in Jordan 
with similar demands. Aside from these groups, the ultra conservative Salafi Movement 
organized one protest calling for Islamic Sharia law to rule Jordan. Also, labor groups 
and Islamists arranged protests with concern to Israel’s mission and Jordan’s peace 
agreement with Israel.  
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Distinct groups or parties did not organize Algeria’s protests until a couple 
months into the Arab Spring. The groups organized protests consisted of the Rally for 
Culture and Democracy (RCD), Algerian League for Defense of Human Rights 
(LADDH), Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD), Zionist groups, and an 
umbrella group consisting of human rights leaders, lawyers, and unionists. University 
students, young males, radical Islamists, terrorist groups, the Algerian Communal 
Guards, and the Algerian Municipal Guards assembled the rest of the demonstrations.  
 With regards to location, Algeria’s protests were more widespread and occurred 
in a number of local areas. Regardless, Jordan faced a number of widespread protests, 
including ones in a number of tribal areas. For Jordan, the majority of protests occurred 
in Amman. The rest of the protests mainly occurred in Salhub, Karak, Dhiban, Maan, 
tribal areas, such as Tafileh, and Northern areas, such as Irbid, Jerash, and Ajlun. For 
Algeria, the majority of the protests occurred in Algiers. The rest of the demonstrations 
occurred in Ennakhil, Diar el Babor, Cervantes, Msila, Tipaza province, Tebessa 
province, Anaba, Tlemcen, Oran, Diar el Mahsoul, Qued Koriche, villages in Azazga, 
Zeralda, Esharaqa, Tibaza, Bab el-Oued, Les Palmiers, Bejaja, and Eastern cities, such as 
Jiel, Setif, Bouira, and Constantine. Similarly, the majority of protests occurred in the 
capital cities. The demonstrations in the capital regions were also the largest ones in each 
country. Protesters in Jordan and Algeria organized demonstrations outside the capital 
and outside mosques. Also, in both Jordan and Algeria, protesters organized 
demonstrations after Friday prayers.  
 Between Algeria and Jordan, quite a number of injuries took place. Algeria’s 
protests were more violent overall, therefore producing more injuries. Even though more 
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injuries were produced in Algeria’s violent protests, more clashes between government 
supporters and government protesters occurred in Jordan. Overall, there were about eight 
different occasions where clashes occurred in Jordan. The injuries usually occurred as a 
result of violent actions, such as government supporters throwing stones at government 
protesters, and vice versa. Some of the clashes were bloody and Jordanians in critical 
condition. Police officers were also critically injured in one of the clashes. There was 
only one death reported in all of the clashes.   
 From the start Algeria’s protests were more violent than those Jordan. For the 
most part the clashes did not occur between the government supporters and the 
government protesters. Only a few government supporters participated in the protests. 
The clashes mainly occurred between the government protesters and the police officers. 
A number of the injuries and deaths were also produced through self-immolations, which 
did not occur in Jordan. In most cases, the Algerian police officers were more injured 
than the Algerian civilians. One of the riots produced over four hundred injuries and on 
many cases people were in critical condition from the clashes. Most of the time, the 
violent government protesters threw petrol bombs, Molotov cocktails, hard objects, and 
stones. A number of deaths also resulted form the clashes between the protesters and the 
police officers, one as a result of a bomb attack committed by a terrorist group on 
military patrol. Many times protesters also ransacked buildings and police headquarters, 
set cars on fire, threw bricks at Algerian forces, and broke into post offices and schools, 
which also took place in Jordan, but more so in Algeria. Overall, Algeria’s protests were 
much more violent than Jordan’s protests, as a number of Algerian’s believed that 
violence was the only way to bring about reform.  
                                                                                                                                       Berger 100 
 With regards to security, police officers in Jordan and Algeria handled the 
protests and riots similarly. In both cases the government mobilized the police officers in 
mass numbers for all of the protests. They were sent out to standby, mediate the situation, 
and practice restraint. In both countries, the police officers ended up using tear gas and 
weapons to break up the violent riots many times, especially when the government 
protesters attacked the police officers. Specifically in Jordan, the police open fired at a 
major riot on November 13, 2012. In both cases, the police officers made many arrests 
and detained a large number of protesters. In Algeria the police officers blocked off the 
capital city with barricades to prevent organized demonstrations.   
Government Responses 
 
 Similar to the protests, there are a number of similarities and differences between 
the government responses in Jordan and Algeria. With regards to the common 
government responses under the two regimes, there were many similarities. Under 
economic responses, both the Jordanian and the Algerian regimes presented packages of 
initiatives to deal with the protesters issues with unemployment and rising prices. In 
Jordan, a 225 million dollar package was created in fuel prices and food staples for 
Jordanian citizens. Similar to this, an economic package was assembled in Algeria to 
decrease unemployment with benefits such as money for public banks to invest in 
businesses.  
 With regards to political responses, both Jordan and Algeria lifted long lasting 
laws in regards to protests. In Jordan, King Abdullah II revised the Public Gatherings 
Law, which allowed citizens to demonstrate without the permission of the government. In 
Algeria, the nineteen-year-old state of emergency law was lifted. Each of these laws still 
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came with restrictions, but they were still considered huge steps for each country, as they 
were tangible reforms. Jordan and Algeria also made efforts to establish freer and fairer 
elections. Jordan’s king made a number of initiatives to reform the election process. 
These initiatives included constitutional changes, such as the creation of an Independent 
Elections Commission and a new electoral law. Even so, a number of the reforms dealt 
with surface problems and only appeared to be substantive.    
Some of the promises that Jordan’s king made consisted of reforming the electoral 
process, where cabinets would be created based on the majority of the elected parliament, 
revisions of election laws, and the creation of an independent council that would 
administer parliamentary elections. Aside from the promises, Jordan’s king also made 
tangible efforts to reform the election process, such as, calling meetings to deal with 
election corruption, conducting personal meetings with the Independent Election 
Commission to ensure transparency and fairness in the election, and setting three 
conditions to guarantee effective and fair elections. The Algerian government did not 
make as many efforts to ensure transparent elections, but Bouteflika appeared to have 
established fairer elections and made promises to revise the laws for elections to ensure a 
representative democracy. Bouteflika never revised any of the election laws, but he did 
allow EU observers to monitor the polls for transparency. Finally, Jordan and Algeria’s 
political responses overlapped through their promises for constitutional amendments. 
Jordan’s king even went further and announced that he would create a National Dialogue 
Committee, where proposals to the constitution would be drawn up. Jordan’s king 
successfully followed up on this promised and constitutional laws were created to 
develop Jordan.    
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Similarities were also viewed in Jordan and Algeria’s efforts to make promises 
and announcements to quell the protests and deal with surface problems, although these 
responses were distinct to each country. In regards to Jordan, King Abdullah II first made 
promises that he would start to include the Islamic Action Front and Islamist groups into 
the government more. King Abdullah II also made promises for economic and political 
reforms at National Unity Day. Jordan’s king promised that he would look into a 
resolution to the corruption problem and allow parliament to finally elect the prime 
minster next year. In regards to Algeria, Bouteflika made announcements and promises 
that he would decrease food prices and allow Algerians better access to the media.  
Specifically in Jordan, a number of tangible reforms were created to deal with the 
protesters and develop the country. Abdullah II’s main political strategy was to reshuffle 
the government. Since the protests started in 2011, Jordan’s king has appointed three new 
prime ministers. A number of the prime ministers had even served in the past, which 
reveals his lack of commitment to real change. King Abdullah II also completely 
dissolved parliament in October of 2012. With regards to replacements, Jordan’s king 
hired a new intelligence chief because citizens were complaining that the current chief 
was using illegal intimidation methods. To further political initiatives, King Abdullah II 
called for a National Unity Day, where he expressed his thoughts about Jordan’s future 
and developments the government was working on, such as ways to better education. In 
concern to economic efforts, aside from the economic package, King Abdullah II 
increased wages for civil servants and those in the army.  
The Algerian government responded to the protests in a number of unique ways. 
The Algerian government used religious leaders to calm down protesters. Bouteflika also 
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requested Algerians to demonstrate peacefully, but also threatened them with detainment 
and punishments if they did not follow the rules. The Algerian government followed up 
with these threats a number of times and arrested a number of rioters. Aside from the 
arrests, the Algerian police officers also prevented protesters from entering the capital if 
they suspected a planned demonstration. With regards to concessions, the Algerian 




 A number of theories have been drawn up amongst scholars about the reasons as 
to why Arab authoritarian regimes have remained intact post-Arab Spring. Some of these 
theories have been specific to Jordan and Algeria, while some of these arguments have 
overlapped between the two countries. General arguments concerning all of the Arab 
authoritarian regimes also connect to both Jordan and Algeria, pointing to strong 
conclusions about Arab authoritarian endurance. With concern to reasons distinct to 
Jordan, arguments all fall under political initiatives. Symbolism has been a significant 
belief among scholars. Many times, King Abdullah II uses democratic language in his 
speeches and engages in symbolic acts to make it seem as if he is developing Jordan and 
moving towards reforms. It is also evident that King Abdullah II presents himself as a 
non-partisan leader, but will blame the government consistently for unpopular reforms. 
Lastly, King Abdullah II constantly reshuffles the Jordanian government and appoints 
new prime ministers every so often to appease protesters. Since the Arab Spring, Jordan’s 
king has appointed three new prime ministers and dissolved parliament right before 
elections.  
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 Theorists have made arguments about a number of reforms and initiatives to keep 
protesters from taking down the Algerian regime. These arguments have fallen under 
economic, geographical, and demographical reasons. As far as economic reasons go, 
Algeria’s oil and natural gas reserves make up its economy and strengthen the regime. 
Algeria’s government owns SONATRACH, the ninth largest company in the world. 
Overall, Algeria’s resource wealth has allowed it to thrive as a strong economic regime. 
Aside from economic reasons, the geography of Algeria is distinctive to its endurance. 
Algeria is made up of mountain ranges that divide terrain, creating major cleavages 
between groups that are unable to connect. Similarly, demographics have split up Arabs 
and Berbers. The Arabs and Berbers constantly argue, rather than focusing on common 
grievances. Ultimately, the Arabs and Berbers are unable to come together to form an 
opposition group.  
Aside from distinct theories for each country, scholars have overlapped in their 
arguments for both Jordan and Algeria’s endurance. These arguments fall under political 
reasons. One of the overlapping political arguments is the creation of reforms and 
promises. Both Bouteflika and Abdullah II have made countless reforms and 
announcements to appease the oppositions groups. For example, Jordan revised the 
Public Gatherings Law, while Algeria lifted the State of Emergency. Bouteflika and 
Abdullah II have also called for democratic change and constitutional amendments. They 
have not always followed through with their initiatives, but the promises have quieted the 
protesters. It is also evident that the Jordanian and Algerian regimes have placed many 
restrictions on protests that led to unsuccessful protests.  
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The governments use the threat of chaos as a political tool to keep citizens in line. 
Abdullah II and Bouteflika consistently use their own government as the main mediator 
between rival groups. Both leaders have expressed their “concerns” for the public if the 
regimes were to fall, as the destruction can lead to violent power struggles between rival 
groups within the states. Abdullah II and Bouteflika have even noted that powerful 
Western countries can take advantage of the countries if they were to be ousted. Algeria’s 
government uses the threat of chaos, even more so than Jordan’s government. Algerians 
are constantly reminded about the threat of radical Islamic takeover, as they faced a 
brutal civil war in the past with extreme Islamists. Bouteflika is viewed as a legitimate 
ruler compared to Islamic groups, and therefore Algerians do not want to risk chaos with 
a revolution. 
Finally, the issue of societal cleavages is a political argument for both Jordan and 
Algeria’s endurance. Jordan’s regime magnifies the societal cleavages as a political tool, 
while the societal cleavages in Algeria naturally cause a problem for opposition groups. 
In Jordan, the societal cleaves occur among Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians, 
as well as among government supporters and government opponents. The government 
exacerbates the notion that Palestinian Jordanians are considered to be “less Jordanian” 
by Transjordanians, making Palestinian Jordanians less loyal to the monarchy and the 
state. The Jordanian government also embraces the government supporters, rendering the 
government opponents as weak political forces. 
The theories for Jordan and Algeria’s endurance overlap with arguments between 
scholars about the endurance of all Arab authoritarian regimes prior to the Arab Spring. 
These theories were revealed in the literature review. These arguments fall under the 
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categories political, security, and economic reasons. In terms of political reasons, 
scholars argue that Arab authoritarian regimes are able to endure due to their legitimate 
appearance. They create the image of success and popularity. This relates to Jordan, as 
many theorists explain how Jordan’s regime lasts due to traditional legitimacy. As a 
monarchy, Jordan is rooted in early Islamic history and has followed an Islamic lineage. 
Jordanians are not willing to take down a regime that traces back to the Prophet 
Mohammad with religious authority. Scholars believe that Algeria prevailed due to 
legitimacy, but more so due to historical legitimacy. Due to Algeria’s past bloody civil 
wars, Algerians are scarred by violence, destruction, and terrorist attacks. Not only does 
these wars trigger feelings of nationalism, but also Algerians are not willing to start a 
revolution as a result of these historical events. Algeria now has an elected leader that is 
viewed as legitimate because he works to fight off threatening and terrorist radical 
groups.  
Patrimonialism is also a common argument among scholars for Arab authoritarian 
regimes, including Jordan and Algeria. In regards to Jordan, the citizens are often times 
bought off in various ways from its influx of foreign aid. The Jordanian government sets 
up top down approaches where foreign aid is given out to the population to appease the 
protesters. Jordan’s government also created jobs in the public sector to buy off its 
citizens. With regards to Algeria, the government buys off its opposition groups with 
money from oil and natural gas reserves. Often times the government spends the money 
on regime elites and groups, such as the military pouvoir, to keep the population in line. 
They also buy off the protesters with the oil reserve wealth to satisfy economic 
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grievances. The Algerian government uses the resource wealth for food subsidies, wages 
to court clerics and municipal servants, young entrepreneurs, and youth loans. 
 In addition to patrimonialism, the multi-party system is a popular political 
argument among theorists for Arab authoritarian regimes that overlaps with Jordan and 
Algeria. This allows for the inclusion of opposition groups into government, but places 
various restrictions on them that does not allow them to move anywhere under the 
system. For example, scholars have pointed out that most Arab authoritarian regimes 
have a monopoly on the media, which restricts opposition groups from campaigning. In 
Jordan, opposition groups and business elites are included in parliament. Since their 
inclusion, they have become loyal to the regime, which guarantees the endurance of 
Jordan’s regime. Algeria’s multi-party system provides support for the regime, as 
Bouteflika’s party commands control, the prime minister runs the Presidential Alliance, 
and the opposition parties are unable to campaign. 
 In addition to patrimonialism and the multi-party system, Western and 
international support is a significant political reason for the endurance of Arab 
authoritarianism that applies to Jordan and Algeria. As explained earlier, Jordan has great 
relations with many Western countries, such as the United States, and receives support in 
the form of foreign aid. Algeria has a lot of international support from many different 
areas. Ever since 1999, Algeria has had great relations with the Middle East, North 
Africa, and the West. Algeria is also a member of the Arab League, OAU, and was 
formally a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2004 and 
2005. Most importantly, Algeria has formed Western alliances to focus on 
counterterrorism efforts.   
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Lastly, among political reasons, the lack of ability to coordinate among 
oppositions groups has helped Arab regimes endure. In Algeria, the CNCD was the most 
organized opposition party during the post Arab spring protests, but there were too many 
internal disagreements among the organization. Also, oppositions groups outside the 
Algerian government disagree on the role of religion in government and how they should 
organize protests, which does not allow them to come together and form common 
grievances and effective coalitions. In general, Langhor believes there is too much civil 
society in Arab regimes, which takes away from the participation in political parties. She 
argues how citizens under Arab authoritarian regimes take too much of a role in non-
governmental organizations and other groups, which appeal to specific interests. 
Therefore, there is a lack of mobilization because citizens do not come together for 
common interests. In opposition, Whitaker believes civil society is too weak because 
groups do not have enough power and resources to form successful protests. Overall, 
citizens under Arab authoritarian regimes are unable to come together on the basis of 
common grievances. 
On top of the legitimacy and political reasons, scholars argue security reasons for 
the endurance of Arab authoritarian regimes that overlap with Jordan and Algeria. Under 
most Arab authoritarian regimes, the security forces are coercive and strong. A number of 
the Arab regimes have an army, security forces, and secret police that all contribute its 
strength. The secret police will listen, spy, arrest, interrogate, and restrict activity, leading 
to unsuccessful protests and fearful citizens. In both Algeria and Jordan, the security 
forces fight off the protesters with their coercive force and power. In Jordan, the General 
Intelligence Department and secret police take charge as security forces, while the 
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pouvoir militare take command as security forces in Algeria. All of these security forces 
have banned and blocked protests, armed themselves with weapons, beat rioters with 
batons, used tear gas to break up protests, and detained protesters. Algerians have 
expressed fear of a military crackdown, which limited their engagement in protests and 
secret political activity. Jordanians have been fearful of voicing their concerns because of 
the military and secret police around. Bellin explains how the coercive apparatus of the 
states remains effective and coherent in the face of protesters.  
In addition to security forces’ coercive apparatus and strength, the military is 
completely loyal to the regimes. Most of Arab authoritarian regimes pay their security 
forces very well, including Jordan and Algeria. In Algeria specifically, they are integrated 
into the government politics. Therefore, the security forces would take over if the leader 
were ever ousted, which encourages citizens to call for reforms rather than a full regime 
change. Overall, with the exception of a couple of Arab authoritarian regimes, the 
security forces remain loyal to the regimes and fight off opposition groups for the 
survival of the governments.  
Moreover, the literature review theories adequately explain the Jordanian and 
Algerian post-Arab Spring cases. Although a number of overlapping theories applies to 
Arab authoritarian regimes that have fallen to the Arab Spring uprisings, such as the 
multi-party system, patrimonialism, resource wealth, international support, and coercive 
security forces. For example, all of these arguments apply to Egyptian regime, which fell 
to the Arab Spring revolution. Thus, post-Arab Spring theories that apply to Jordan and 
Algerias’ endurance can be added to the literature review theories. These arguments 
include, reforms and announcements, the threat of chaos without the presence of the 
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regimes, and societal cleavages. There are also a number of literature review theories that 
are not widely covered by theorists for Jordan and Algeria. These include the religion of 
Islam, poor regimes that lead to poor education and low literacy rates, family honor, and 
politicized education. Most of these theories still help us understand the cases of Jordan 
and Algeria, but scholars did not focus on these areas when focusing on Jordan and 
Algeria. 
Overall, there are many similarities and differences amongst Jordan and Algeria’s 
regimes. The linkages connect to many other Arab authoritarian regimes that continue to 
endure to this day. The endurance of Arab authoritarian regimes is compelling, as the 
case studies of Jordan and Algeria reveal many factors that support the stabilization of the 
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